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Abstract
The Cold War and Decolonization in British Guiana: The Anglo-American Intervention and
Guianese Nationalist Politics
Joshua David Esposito
This thesis examines the end of colonial rule in British Guiana and what it tells us about the
relationship between decolonization and the Cold War. It explores how the end of a four hundred
year period of European nation-state domination of the world led to a complex shift in global
power structures and considerable conflict. From 1953 to 1966 nationalist leaders in British
Guiana struggled to achieve independence from Great Britain and fought to establish their
position in the future government of Guyana. Colonialism, however, left a unique imprint on
British Guiana’s cultural development, and created a volatile society that left the colony marred
by racial violence. Additionally, Guianese autonomy was limited by Anglo-American Cold War
imperatives in the Caribbean. The decolonization of British Guiana became a struggle, and
eventually a compromise, between British and American officials, as well as between the AngloAmerican alliance and Guianese nationalists.
This thesis explores one aspect of that power struggle in detail. It shows how Cheddi Jagan’s
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign
policy after the Cuban Revolution in 1959 that was in conflict with United States Cold War
goals. Meanwhile, Forbes Burnham and the People’s National Congress (PNC) sought to
establish a working relationship with the United States. As a result, the United States and Great
Britain chose to subvert the elected PPP government and grant independence to British Guiana
under a government led by Burnham. The experience of independence in British Guiana
illuminates then, the intricate relationship between the Cold War, decolonization, and the
struggle for self-government in the developing world.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Twentieth Century was a period of extensive transformation in the global power
structure, which had been dominated by European nation states for over four hundred years.
Competition between European powers for control of global markets, people, and resources
culminated in two massive world wars from 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. Two of the most
important consequences of this tumultuous period were the rapid global decolonization of
European empires and the Cold War. Most of the former colonized world had achieved, or was
well on the way to achieving independence within twenty years of the armistice ending the
Second World War in 1945. Simultaneously, the United States and its Western allies were
heavily engaged in a conflict with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations for ideological,
as well as physical, control over the newly autonomous areas. The people of formerly colonized
territories sought to take advantage of this international climate, which was hostile to
imperialistic policies toward the developing world. People who had been recently under the
formal control of empires, as well as others who had been informally controlled by powerful
outside influences, attempted to assert their self-interest by appealing to the rhetoric of the postwar international community. Third world nationalism developed as third world peoples asserted
what they saw as their right to self-determination asserting that powerful nations should not
threaten the sovereignty of developing areas by interfering in their domestic affairs.1

1

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso,
1983); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). Hyam discusses in detail the impact of international opposition to European colonization on
imperial policy in Great Britain. Specifically, he explains how institutions such as the United Nations altered the
international community by creating a unified opposition to colonialism and thus further eroded the ability of the
British to maintain an empire in light of their weakened post-war economic and military position, hastening the end
of formal control of peripheral areas by powerful nations.
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However, nationalist leaders frequently discovered that rhetorical overtures and practical
actions were not the same, and that powerful nations continued to protect their interests by
intervening in developing nations, even while formal empires were fading into the annals of
history. The end of European hegemony signaled the beginning of a period of redefinition of
international relationships. Thus, conflict was likely as nationalist leaders, former colonizers, and
the new leading nations of the international community, the United States and the Soviet Union,
competed for supremacy in newly restructured regions.
This thesis will use the independence process in British Guiana from 1953 to 1966 as a
microcosm to explore the correlation between the Cold War and post-World War II
decolonization. Specifically, it will contextualize the Anglo-American decision to undermine the
popularly elected Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) government and its leader, Cheddi Jagan, and
in its place, support a regime fronted by Forbes Burnham, who was understood to be racist,
irresponsible, and vehemently anti-British. However, what is important was that, at least initially,
Burnham was anti-communist.2 The British and American decision to intervene in and
manipulate local politics was a consequence of the impact of the Cold War and decolonization
on policymaking. Additionally, this thesis will examine how the foreign policy decisions of
Guianese politicians impacted the British and American policy toward the colony. British
Guiana offers a unique opportunity to explore how nationalist leaders and policymakers in the
United States and Great Britain struggled with and against each other within the framework of
the Cold War as they attempted to reshape the post-colonial world.

2

Melby to Rusk, 20 March, 1962, 841d.06/3-2062, Central Decimal Files Box 2478, RG 59, Records of the
Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
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Although studies of the decolonization process in British Guiana have focused on the
actions of the United States and Great Britain, this thesis will also examine the considerable
impact Guianese leaders had on the development of Anglo-American policy and the overall
decolonization process in British Guiana. Scholars such as Stephen Rabe have clearly established
that the United States and Great Britain manipulated the decolonization process in British Guiana
to achieve a specific political goal, the establishment of a pro-American government after
independence. Rabe’s work answers the question of how that happened, essentially through
intervention by the United States, both physically in British Guiana and diplomatically in Great
Britain.3This thesis will not refute that conclusion; rather, it will provide a nuanced explanation
of why the United State and Great Britain determined that intervention was necessary to avert a
crisis in post-colonial Guyana and why that decision was crucial to regional Cold War strategy.
Ultimately, this thesis argues that Guianese leaders pursued foreign policies that actively shaped
Anglo-American strategy in British Guiana. This thesis thus reinforces the conclusion reached by
scholars such as Odd Arne Westad and Jason Parker, who explain how the interrelated dynamics
of the Cold War and global decolonization impacted and were impacted by developing areas of
the world.4
The first chapter examines how the characteristics of British colonization created the
setting for a complex and volatile struggle for an autonomous government in British Guiana.
Colonial structures defined immigration, internal migration, as well as economic, social, and
political developments in the colony. During the independence period, defined in this thesis as
the period between 1953 to1966, opportunistic politicians, primarily Burnham and Jagan
3

Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2005).
4
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK: 2005), 3; Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire
in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

3

exploited ethnic loyalties resulting from the culturally segregated society brought on by colonial
development to build their base of support. The consequence of such political measures was a
movement toward self-government characterized by racial violence and domestic instability.5
Simultaneously, limited suffrage during the colonial period ensured that political organization in
British Guiana before 1950 was almost entirely the product of liberal organized labor
movements.6 The liberal ideology of nationalist leaders in the colony and the connection between
international worker movements and national communist parties was a source of concern for the
United States during the Cold War as leftist politics became increasingly associated with an
international communist conspiracy.7 Thus, colonial development created two main challenges
for British Guiana as it advanced toward independence from 1953 to1966. First, Guianese
leaders and British colonial officials struggled to establish a viable government which could
maintain stability and general domestic peace after the withdrawal of British soldiers from the
colony. Secondly, Guianese leaders needed to develop a foreign policy which best convinced the
United States that mild domestic reforms and relations with communist nations were not a veiled
attempt to establish an anti-American, communist government in British Guiana after
independence. The general history of colonialism in British Guiana and an overview of the
decolonization process provided in chapter one will lay the groundwork for the research of
subsequent chapters.
5

There are a number of comprehensive explanations of the connection between colonial development and the
independence period in British Guiana. See: Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British
Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967); Cheddi Jagan, The West On Trial: My Fight For Guyana’s
Freedom (New York: International Publishers, 1966); Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana; Thomas Spinner,
Political and Social History of Guyana 1945-83 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
6
There are several effective explanations of the impact of organized labor on Guianese politics. See: Robert J.
Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in the English –Speaking West Indies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Kay
Saunders, ed. Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920 (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984).
7
The terms liberal and leftist are used frequently throughout this thesis to describe the political ideology of
nationalist leaders in British Guiana and the Caribbean. In short, they refer to the ideological belief in heavy
government involvement in social programs and domestic reform. The liberal ideology in Guianese politics was
influenced by its origin in workers movements. The United States frequently saw this ideology in Latin America as
anti-capitalist and closely related to or easily manipulated by communism.

4

The second chapter will explore the strategic imperatives of the United States and Great
Britain during the period leading up to Guianese independence within the context of the Cold
War and global decolonization. The United States interpreted events in British Guiana almost
entirely through the prism of a Cold War lens; therefore, American policymaking in the colony
was skewed by Cold War geo-strategic imperatives.8 There were several factors which
convinced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make British Guiana a priority.
Geographically, the small enclave on mainland South America occupied a critical location for
hemispheric defense during the Cold War. British Guiana’s proximity to Venezuela, the main
outlet for capital from the United States in Latin America; Brazil, the largest and potentially most
powerful nation in South America; the Panama Canal, perhaps the most important point of
defense of all for the United States; and the islands of the Caribbean, made it strategically
significant despite the diminutive size of the colony. The presence of a modern airfield in the
colony made its geographic location even more relevant. However, the overriding concern for
the United States in British Guiana was its ideological significance. The progression of the
Cuban Revolution toward communism and its eventual alliance with the Soviet Union was an
ideological loss that the United States determined to avoid repeating elsewhere in the region.
Arthur Schlesinger, special advisor to President John F. Kennedy, described British Guiana as a
target of convenience; however from an ideological perspective, it was a target of the utmost
priority.9
The primary objective of the British Colonial Office in British Guiana was to prepare the
colony for independence as quickly and efficiently as possible. Tactically, that meant
8

The direct relationship between American Cold War imperatives and policymaking toward British Guiana is
clearly explained by Arthur Schlesinger. See: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the
White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965).
9
Ibid, 774.
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establishing a government capable of sustaining domestic stability and avoiding post-colonial
violence similar to events that occurred in India or the Congo.10 Strategically, however, the
foremost objective of the British Foreign Office was the maintenance of a special relationship
with the United States, making American regional Cold War anxieties British concerns as well.
Maintaining close ties to the United States meant that the British would accede to American
demands with regards to the political make-up of the soon to be independent British West Indian
territories. Certainly Great Britain had Cold War objectives of its own; however, its association
with the United States demanded that American strategy take precedence. Despite considerable
disagreements and contentious exchanges between the Colonial Office and Foreign Office, as
well as between the United States and Great Britain, in the end the two nations formulated a
coherent and unified policy toward British Guiana.11 Ultimately, the continuation of the AngloAmerican special relationship proved to be the most important objective of British policy and
Colonial Office concerns about the American strategy in British Guiana were overlooked to
formulate a cohesive policy with the United States.
The focus of the third chapter is on acknowledging the critical role of Guianese
nationalist politicians in influencing Anglo-American policy toward British Guiana. The United
States, eventually with British approval, funded subversive attempts against the PPP despite the
fact that the party had won all three elections in the colony since the implementation of universal
suffrage in 1953. Scholars traditionally attribute the American policy to overzealous anticommunists in Washington who viewed foreign policy through a narrow Cold War lens. Richard

10

There was considerable discord and violence which resulted from an ill-conceived process of British
decolonization in India . See: Yasim Kahn, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2007); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez
and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 496-499,701-702.
11
The most overtly aggressive exchanges occur between Sir Alec Home of the Foreign Office and Secretary of State
Dean Rusk. See: Home to Rusk, 26 February 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, 12:266.
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Barnet, for example, explains American Cold War policy as overly rigid when classifying
emerging governments, arguing that the presence of some or all of a number of liberal policies
was sufficient to establish the basis for opposition to that government from the United States.
Most of the characteristics that Barnet identified, including land reform, possible nationalization
of private industry, acceptance of Chinese or Soviet aid, and the pursuance of a non-aligned
foreign policy, were aspects of PPP strategy in British Guiana. 12 Similarly, Stephen Rabe
interprets American intervention in British Guiana as an overreaction by American officials to
domestic reforms, fearing that they were a precursor to communism, and a misunderstanding of
the political position of the PPP leadership, specifically Cheddi Jagan.13 This thesis does not
directly dispute the assertions of these renowned scholars; however, by focusing on the actions
of Guianese officials, it does present a more nuanced explanation for events in British Guiana by
addressing the actions of Guianese leaders themselves.
Rather than focusing primarily on how Cold War ideology impacted policymakers in the
United States, this thesis will explain how leaders in the developing world impacted American
foreign policy. In British Guiana, the failure of the PPP to conduct an effective foreign policy,
specifically, its inability or unwillingness to work with the United States, was the catalyst for
American inspired or directed subversive attempts against party leadership. The Cuban
Revolution caused American leaders to fear spreading communism in the Caribbean and
influenced PPP leadership to a considerable degree. PPP leadership, specifically Jagan,
misinterpreted the consequences of the Cuban Revolution as it related to other Caribbean nations

12

Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: The World
Publishing Company, 1968).
13
Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 78-79, 81-83.

7

and their alignment in the Cold War. Thus, the PPP engaged in a foreign policy which
undermined its position in British Guiana.
Finally, this thesis will challenge the idea that the British decision to undermine the PPP
was solely the result of acquiescing to American demands. It suggests rather that Great Britain
pursued its own self interest in respect to British Guiana, although American pressure influenced
the British decision making process. However, American pressure does not alone explain the
British course of action in the colony. Financial concerns and fear of instability in British Guiana
played a critical role in determining British policy. This work will examine the PPP’s foreign
policy and contextualize Cheddi Jagan’s political decisions rather than dismiss him as
ideologically confused.14 Jagan pursued consistent and coherent domestic and foreign policies
for twenty years from his earliest involvement in labor movements to his eventual loss of power
in 1964. Conversely, after ending his association with Jagan in 1955, Forbes Burnham and the
People’s National Congress (PNC) courted United States officials effectively and avoided open
rhetorical opposition to American leaders or association with communist nations. Ultimately, the
third chapter will explain how the foreign policy conducted by Guianese leaders largely
determined the outcome of events in British Guiana.
Review of the Relevant Literature
This thesis speaks to a broad historiography in developing a comprehensive analysis of
the relationship between British Guiana, the United States, and Great Britain during the Cold
War and decolonization. Specifically, it will address the historical literature concerning the
special relationship between the United States and Great Britain during the Cold War, the Cold

14

Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 78.

8

War in general, British decolonization, British Guiana, United States-Latin American relations,
and the role of nationalist leaders in the developing world. One of the key aspects of the Cold
War was the special relationship that developed between the United States and Great Britain,
forged in the anti-Axis struggle of World War II, but maintained after the Second World War to
more effectively combat the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and international
communism. From the perspective of Great Britain and the United States, the soon to be
independent colonies were not prepared for self-rule until their incoming governments were
evaluated within a Cold War strategic context. It was necessary for former colonies to show that
they could successfully repel any communist influence within their nation, which implied,
primarily, the ability to maintain internal stability and willing alignment with the West. A
number of authors have effectively discussed the importance of international relations in British
decolonization. Ronald Hyam’s Britain’s Declining Empire adequately explains the implications
of the post-World War II international setting and the effects of organizations such as the United
Nations on influencing Great Britain’s colonial policies. He contextualizes the major factors
leading to the dissolution of the British Empire within the international community, while
discussing several areas which decolonized in an exceptional manner, such as British Guiana.
Hyam discusses the interplay between the United States and Great Britain, specifically the
paradox between British attempts to cultivate a special relationship with the United States while
maintaining the ability to act independently of their America counterparts.15
Like Hyam, William Roger Louis acknowledges the primacy of international affairs in
determining the direction of British decolonization. In Ends of British Imperialism, Louis
discusses the evolution of the principle of self-determination for British colonies during the early

15

Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire,12-14.

9

to middle twentieth century from the mandates system of the League of Nations to the
trusteeship system of the United Nations. Louis suggests that one of the most significant factors
leading to decolonization was the reinterpretation of the meaning of self-determination from a
manner of extending moderate autonomy to colonized regions to political independence for
European colonies. Louis also notes that a key characteristic of decolonization was the British
attempt to maintain influence in former colonial areas, in part through cooperation with the
United States and the strategic use of American aid to developing areas.16 Louis further
contextualizes the United States pursuit of trusteeship during and after World War II and its
implications for the future of the British Empire in Imperialism at Bay.17 Many of the same
issues that impacted the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States during
the decolonization process in British Guiana began during the diplomatic wrangling of the
Second World War. Specifically, Franklin Roosevelt’s firm anti-colonial stance created tensions
between the United States and Great Britain before the rise of the Soviet Union in 1943 and led
to a re-evaluation of American policy toward colonial areas. Louis suggests that in mid-1943 the
United States began pursuing a policy of military security which led to occasional support for the
British imperial system as a counter to growing Soviet influence.18 Fifteen years later, the United
States still struggled with balancing rhetorical support for colonial self-determination with
American security concerns in British Guiana. Louis also notes the use of the lend-lease
agreements with Great Britain as a means of advancing American interests during World War

16

Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, xi, 26-29.
William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire 194145 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
18
Ibid, 537, 567.
17
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II.19 The United States used similar economic enticements to help convince the British to support
Forbes Burnham in 1963.20
In addition to Louis, Christopher Thorne’s Allies of a Kind also considers the contentious
aspects of the Anglo-American alliance during World War II. Thorne suggests that the
maintenance of the Anglo-American alliance took precedence over either nation’s individual
interests.21 In British Guiana, British and American decisions were impacted at every turn by the
significance of continuing a cooperative Anglo-American relationship during the Cold War. In
Bitter Rehearsal , Charlie Whitham discusses the dialog between the United States and Great
Britain during and immediately after the Second World War and how it set the tone for
decolonization in the West Indies twenty years later.22
Traditionally, scholars have defined the Cold War as an East-West struggle for political
supremacy in which the main actors were the United States and its Western European allies, and
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Increasingly, however, historians have expanded thought
on the subject to include what were originally considered peripheral, third world, or developing
nations.23 The increased study of developing nations has shifted the focus of the Cold War from
East-West relations to a more complex East-West-North-South dynamic, explained best in Odd
Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War, as well as by Jason Parker, and Gerald Horne.24 Westad
considers the role of superpowers, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, in impacting
the post-colonial development of former European colonies; while at the same time
19

Ibid, 566.
Memorandum of Conversation at Birch Grove, England, 30 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:295.
21
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-45 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978).
22
Charlie Whitham, Bitter Rehearsal: British and American Planning for a Post-War West Indies (London: Praeger
Publishers, 2002).
23
The terms, third world, peripheral, and developing areas have all been used to describe former colonial regions.
The term developing areas will be used for the purposes of this thesis.
24
Westad, The Global Cold War, 3; Parker, Brother’s Keeper; Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone.
20

11

acknowledging the ways in which developing nations established political agendas in response to
superpower intervention.25 Matthew Connelly’s A Diplomatic Revolution considers the close
relationship between the Cold War and decolonization, specifically the significance of
international relations and non-governmental institutions in influencing colonial powers and
creating the post-colonial world. Connelly also considers the critical role of nationalist leaders in
impacting colonial policy.26
Several academics who specialize in the history of inter-American relations have
conducted similar studies of individuals. Eric Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door evaluates the
ways in which Rafael Trujillo maintained power in the Dominican Republic, despite oppressive
dictatorial policies and the massacre of about 12,000 Haitians by establishing a working
relationship with the United States.27 Kyle Longley describes a similar relationship between Jose
Figueres in Costa Rica and the United States in The Sparrow and the Hawk. Figueres engaged in
the type domestic reform policies, specifically land reform, which resulted in United States
intervention in other Latin American nations such as Guatemala and British Guiana. However, a
well-established cooperative relationship with the United States enabled him to undergo those
changes without the same reprisals from Washington. 28 Roorda and Longley describe how
establishing pro-United States, rather than non-aligned foreign policies, allowed regional leaders
to pursue domestic policies with minimal fear of American intervention.

25

Westad, The Global Cold War.
Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold
War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
27
Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican
Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 126.
28
Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of Jose Figueres
(Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1997).
26
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Colin Palmer’s Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean examines the
crucial role of Eric William, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, in shaping the postcolonial Caribbean. 29 Williams was a central figure in the British West Indies during the period
covered in this thesis, both as an academic and political leader and Palmer provides evidence of
Williams’ insights on several important aspects of the independence process in British Guiana.
Specifically, he notes that Williams was concerned about the prospect of prematurely granting
independence in British Guiana, in large part because Jagan and Burnham were more concerned
with pursuing their own personal political ambitions than cooperating to end racial strife and
prepare the colony for self-government.30Thus, Westad, Palmer, Connelly, Longley, and Roorda,
have begun to acknowledge the critical role of political leaders and political and social groups in
the developing world in effecting the trajectory of the Cold War-decolonization era. This thesis
will build on their work by showing how nationalist leaders influenced Anglo-American policy
towards British Guiana.
Charles Ameringer’s The Democratic Left in Exile suggests that individuals, such as
Figueres, were part of a broad Latin American movement which embraced revolutionary
political ideology as a means of challenging the existing political structure in the region, namely,
the authority of dictators, such as Trujillo.31 Ameringer’s work argues that the Caribbean
underwent significant political and social change between World War I and the Cuban
Revolution, in part because of the influence of revolutionary movements in Mexico and the
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Soviet Union.32 In examining the collaboration between regional leaders, Ameringer illustrates
how, at times, there was a fine line between the democratic left and communist regimes.33Most
significantly, the success of the Cuban Revolution was the catalyst for a reinterpretation of the
ideology which had guided the Democratic Left since 1945 and a re-evaluation of the
movement’s goals.34This is perhaps most clear in Venezuela, where a schism developed between
moderate, older members of the Accion Democratica (AD), and the younger, more radical,
“muchachos”.35 Thomas Wright further explores the impact of the Cuban Revolution on regional
ideology and political movements in Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution.36 Wright
suggests that after the split in the AD, the Venezuelan Communist Party became the most active
communist party in Latin America and in 1962 it formally embraced armed struggle against the
existing Venezuelan government.37 The work of Ameringer and Wright further proves that
Caribbean activists and nationalist leaders were active participants in the Cold War, not simply
pawns in a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. This thesis will build on
their work by showing that Guianese nationalists were influenced by the Cold War. Additionally,
it will examine how Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham developed foreign policies based on their
perception of the impact of Cold War events in British Guiana.
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However active regional leaders were, the United States was the most powerful nation in
the region and its policies impacted every facet of regional politics during the Cold War. There
has been considerable research into United States Cold War policy as it relates to the Caribbean
and Latin America. Richard Barnet is critical of American policy, which he interprets as an
overly strict adherence to anti-communism. Barnet suggests that United States officials had
difficulty making foreign policy decisions because their worldview was obscured by a Cold War
lens.38 Similarly, Stephen Rabe is critical of United States policy toward British Guiana. He
suggests that the Kennedy Administration’s inflexible Cold War agenda did not permit a realistic
understanding of the subtleties of the Guianese political situation.39 Arthur Schlesinger’s A
Thousand Days provides key insight into Kennedy Administration policymaking in the
hemisphere as well as important contextualization of the internal dynamics of the White House
from 1961-1963. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, Schlesinger, a historian who
served in the John F. Kennedy Administration, describes how the Cuban Revolution, the failed
Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Cuban Missile Crisis impacted policymaking toward British
Guiana. Schlesinger’s explains that the primary objective of American policy toward the
Caribbean was to avoid a second communist revolution. Crucially, however, Schlesinger notes
that Kennedy sought to carry out a pragmatic policy in the hemisphere after the Bay of Pigs
disaster, potentially working with governments of varying ideologies and domestic agendas, as
long as they were anti-communist. Schlesinger’s description of White House policymaking
suggests that interpretations which attribute the PPP failure in British Guiana to a paranoid anticommunist policy are incomplete.40 Schlesinger’s work suggests that hemispheric leaders could
engage in a degree of independent domestic policymaking, as suggested by Kyle Longley in The
38
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Sparrow and the Hawk and Eric Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door, so long as they supported
American opposition to communism, specifically in the Western Hemisphere.41
Nonetheless, a critical component of United States Cold War policy in Latin America,
and much of the developing world, was covert intervention. Philip Agee’s Inside the Company is
an early depiction of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervention. Agee, a former CIA agent,
discusses how the United States government, with the assistance of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), conducted operations to subvert the
Jagan-led PPP beginning in 1959.42In addition to Agee, James McDonald, Nick Cullather,
Jennifer Dale Kibe, and Gordon Oliver Daniels, have produced important studies which have
contributed to the understanding of American covert subversion activities.43
Anglo-American intervention significantly influenced decolonization in British Guiana;
however, British Guiana’s colonial history created the social and political setting which British
and American policymakers exploited as the colony transitioned to self-government. The
secondary literature on the development of Guianese culture begins with Leo Despres’ Cultural
Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana who explains the instability of the Guianese
independence period as a consequence of the sociological development of the colony.44 He
attributes the physical as well as cultural separation of ethnic groups in British Guiana,
specifically the Afro-Guianese and East Indian communities, to colonial development. Despres
argues that the Christian missionary run educational system alienated East Indians seeking to
41
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preserve their Hindu culture. He emphasizes that the physical separation of Afro-Guianese, who
primarily resided in urban areas, and East Indians, who mostly remained on rural plantations, led
to the emergence of a culturally pluralistic society in British Guiana.45 Despres asserts that
cultural pluralism was the basis for eventual strife as the nationalist movement progressed. He
concludes that the culturally pluralistic nature of Guianese society and the willingness of
politicians, specifically Jagan and Burnham, to exploit racial differences for political advantage,
were the primary factors which destroyed the unified nationalist movement in the colony and
defined the independence period. 46 Rishee Thakur takes issue with Despres and traditional
cultural pluralists who subordinate the important role of political ideology among third world
nationalists to simplistic cultural explanations. He contextualizes cultural pluralism as the
Caribbean variant of Modernization Theory.47 Although cultural divisions existed in Guianese
society, their ability to fragment the nationalist movement was significant only within the
broader context of political and ideological differences within the movement itself. Thakur
concludes that most of the racial violence was a manufactured product of Jagan and Burnham’s
political maneuvering and of American subversion efforts.48
Alan H. Adamson describes the early development of British Guiana’s political economy
as the result of indentured immigration to the colony in the aftermath of the emancipation of
slaves in the British Empire in 1834 in Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920.
45
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Adamson concludes that the system of indentured servitude in British Guiana resulted in an
economic monoculture based on sugar and, like Despres, a culturally pluralistic society.49 In A
History of Organized Labor in the English-Speaking West Indies, Robert J. Alexander examines
how the political development of British Guiana, as with most of the British West Indies, grew
out of organized labor movements.50 Alexander describes how severe limitations on suffrage in
the colony forced the majority of the population to seek political voice through labor unions.
However, as suffrage expanded unions maintained considerable influence over political parties
and parties sought to develop alliances with established unions or replace them with
organizations loyal to the parties themselves.
The intimate relationship between organized labor and political parties was the impetus
for much of the conflict and violence of the independence period.51 In Cold War in a Hot Zone,
Gerald Horne describes how organized labor in the British West Indies played a critical role in
influencing the timing and trajectory of independence movements in the Caribbean after World
War II. Horne explains that radical labor movements were the impetus for political organization
throughout the region as well as the source of considerable strife with the United States and
Great Britain.52 The radical Marxist ideology of many regional movements, specifically the
Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC), was incompatible with British colonial and American Cold
War imperatives in the hemisphere, and thus led to Anglo-American intervention. Additionally,
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Horne elaborates on the racial politics within British Guiana which led to the disintegration of
unified labor movements in the colony.53
The secondary literature on the decolonization and independence of British Guiana tends
to focus on the involvement of the United States in the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan and the
general decolonization process of the British West Indies. Early interpretations of the
independence process in British Guiana, such as Cheddi Jagan’s The West On Trial, interpreted
events in the colony during the independence period as part of a Cold War struggle wherein the
Guianese became victims of overzealous anti-communists within the United States government.
Jagan’s autobiography attributes the violence of the independence process in British Guiana, and
ultimately the failure of the PPP government to remain in power, to subversive efforts by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Kennedy administration.54 Richard Barnet’s
Intervention and Revolution echoes Jagan’s argument, concluding that land reform measures,
acceptance of aid from communist nations, and the PPP attempt to formulate a non-aligned
foreign policy, caused United States officials to assume that the Guianese government was a
threat to American national security, which in turn, led to covert intervention in the colony.55
Barnet’s work is an early criticism of the tendency of American policymakers to view the world
through a narrow Cold War lens.56 Thomas Spinner’s Political and Social History of Guyana
1945-83 draws similar conclusions to Jagan and Barnet.57 Spinner describes Jagan as a “romantic
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Stalinist” unjustly removed from his position by a Kennedy Administration obsessed with
avoiding a Cuban-like revolution in British Guiana.58
More recently, Stephen Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, determines that in the
wake of the Cuban Revolution, the Kennedy Administration’s fear of confronting a communist
government in the hemisphere resulted in an inflexible and irrational policy of covert subversion
toward a moderate PPP government in British Guiana. Rabe analyzes the interaction between the
Kennedy Administration and high ranking officials in Great Britain, concluding that the British
bowed to American pressure and assisted in destroying democracy in their colony to achieve
American Cold War aims. He also considers the role of non-governmental actors, specifically
American labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organization (AFL-CIO), to add depth to the conclusions drawn from earlier works.59 Rabe
provides a more focused analysis of United States anti-communist policymaking toward Latin
America under the administration of President John F. Kennedy in The Most Dangerous Area in
the World.60 Similarly, Gordon Oliver Daniels’ “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan” suggests that
British and American opposition to Cheddi Jagan was unjustified. Daniels suggests that Jagan
was a nationalist, who British and American officials deemed communist because of his
aggressive attempts to achieve independence for the Guianese people.61Daniels acknowledges
that Jagan’s “reckless diplomacy” had a considerably negative impact on his relationship with
American officials; however, he concludes that the Kennedy Administration’s strict Cold War

58

Ibid, xii.
Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 11.
60
Rabe also considers the Kennedy Administration policy toward British Guiana in an earlier work . See: Stephen
Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin
America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 79-95.
61
Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan”, 1.
59

20

policy drove events in British Guiana.62 Rabe and Daniels show the significant influence of
American intervention in British Guiana, and this thesis will seek to add to their work by
explaining how Jagan influenced British and American policy in British Guiana.
Finally, Jason Parker best explores the role of race in the decolonization of the Caribbean.
Brother’s Keeper contributes substantially to the understanding of the roles of race and the Cold
War during the decolonization process in the British West Indies. Parker, like Gerald Horne,
considers the relationship between British and American imperatives in the Caribbean. He
elaborates on how the United States and Great Britain worked together to maintain stability in
the region, diffusing potentially volatile independence movements as power was transferred from
colonial power to newly emerging governments.63 Additionally, Parker discusses how black
Caribbean leaders such as Marcus Garvey and Norman Manley helped forge political ties
between the British West Indies and the American civil rights movement, which had a growing
influence on domestic politics in the United States.64 Thus, domestic racial politics made it
somewhat difficult for United States policymakers to oppose regional leaders of African descent.
Like Parker, Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War considers the interconnectedness of the
Cold War and decolonization and exemplifies the trajectory toward a more inclusive literature
involving actors in developing areas as well as superpower nations.65This thesis briefly explains
how domestic politics in the United States impacted the Kennedy Administration policy toward
British Guiana, and thus, shows how nationalist leaders engaged the American public as a means
of influencing policymakers in Washington.
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In addition to the secondary literature outlined above, this thesis will make use of a
several key archival resources. Records from the State Department housed at National Archives
II in College Park, Maryland provide most of the information United States officials generated
and thus the primary source for American perspectives on British Guiana and later Guyana.
Additional United States governmental documents are incorporated from the Foreign Relations
of the United States (FRUS) volumes concerning British Guiana from 1961-63 and volume
XXXII Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guiana 1964-68. The FRUS volumes are particularly
valuable in their ability to fill in the gaps despite the considerable number of documents between
high level American officials still classified in the State Department records. Memorandums
from the United States Consulate in Georgetown to the State Department as well as from other
posts in the Caribbean have yielded revealing insight on the evolution of the United States
attitudes toward Forbes Burnham, especially from American officials in the region. Equally
useful are memorandums from upper-level United States administrative officials and high
ranking members of Great Britain’s Foreign Office. Diplomatic exchanges between senior
officials in Whitehall and Washington will be used to determine how United States and British
leaders conceived of their strategic concerns on the ultimate strategy pursued in British Guiana.
The major sources for understanding British perspectives and strategy will be based on
Parliamentary records, records of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and Cabinet
Minute Papers housed at the British National Archives. This project will consider the varying
agendas of the different institutional components of British government and how collective
decisions were made as well as the interplay between the White House and British Parliament.
As in the United States, memoranda and letters between various government posts reveal that
there was a persistent evaluation and re-evaluation of potential leaders in British Guiana. These
22

sources suggest that officials were engaged in an evolving assessment of Burnham and Jagan and
search consistently for a third alternative to lead British Guiana to independence. When
compared with U. S. State Department Records, a picture emerges which makes clear the
complexity of Anglo-American cooperation in British Guiana. The significance of cooperation
between Whitehall and Washington is considered at length by a number of important British
officials whose conversations are accessible through these archives.
Conclusion
Nearly twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and with time a more
nuanced historical perspective is beginning to develop. Historians have concluded that histories
of the Cold War that focus exclusively on great-power cooperation and conflict do not present a
complete story of the Cold War. To obtain a more accurate view of how the Cold War unfolded,
it is necessary to examine the agency of political actors who were not leaders of the great
powers, including nationalist leaders in the developing world. The early 1960’s represented the
height of the Cold War as well as the climax of the long process of global decolonization. The
complex relationship between these two phenomena is evident in the degree to which British
Guiana presented a unique and crucial challenge to the Anglo-American cooperation which
continued after the Second World War.
Events in Cuba throughout the 1960s resulted in a focused Cold War lens through which
the United States contextualized international affairs. Realistic fears existed in regard to
instability and communist infiltration in the Caribbean at the exact moment Great Britain sought
to withdraw from the region. British fears of civil war and instability in their former colony were
well founded. Such a scenario was likely to have occurred if the decolonization process was not
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carefully attended to. The potential for regional instability demanded a coordination of policy
between Great Britain and the United States. The difficulties of collaboration are evident as the
decolonization process is examined.
Ultimately, Guyana provides an excellent example of how Great Britain and the United
States overcame their differences in individual strategic goals and coordinated a Cold War
strategy for decolonization. As such, the process in which the country became the independent
nation of Guyana is an insightful snapshot of the dual actions of both decolonization and Cold
War reality and how they affected one another. Additionally, and perhaps most crucially, British
Guiana presents an opportunity to acknowledge that while the United States drove Western Cold
War policy, American leaders could not ignore events or political leaders in the developing
world. Nationalist leaders in former colonies struggled to assert themselves in a newly
restructured world and they too were forced to comprehend and work successfully within the
framework established by the dual dynamics of the Cold War and decolonization. Nationalist
leaders contributed immensely to the trajectory of the Cold War. It is outrageous that nationalist
leaders in the developing world were forced to consider the imperatives of great powers or risk
intervention; however, it is significant to consider the ways in which nationalist leaders
influenced superpower policy. The actions of men like Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham
influenced to a significant degree they way the great powers of the era pursued the Cold War.
This project, therefore, will examine the complex decolonization process in British Guiana in
light of the power struggle between nationalist leaders, the United States and Great Britain
during the Cold War.
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Colonial History on the Decolonization Process in British Guiana
On May 26, 1966 the largest empire in world history granted independence to its only
colony on the South American mainland, the small enclave of British Guiana. The colony,
known after independence as Guyana, has experienced negligible population growth since its
independence forty-four years ago. Comparatively, it would be the sixtieth largest metro area in
the United States in 2009, slightly edging out Syracuse, New York.1 Guyana encompasses
roughly 83,000 square miles, about the same as Utah or Idaho, although the vast majority of the
population is concentrated on a thin coastal plain.2 Notwithstanding the diminutive size of the
territory in respect to land area and population, British Guiana held a vast significance for Great
Britain and the United States from 1953 to 1966 as the colony struggled to establish a viable
internal government and become an independent nation. Cold War geo-strategic concerns, the
liquidation of the British Empire, and chaos within the colony all contributed to a decade and a
half of intense concern, contention, and cooperation within the Anglo-American alliance.
This chapter will provide a general narrative history of British Guiana as an introduction
to a more involved study of the decolonization and independence process in the colony from
1953 to1966. It will introduce a number of important themes, such as union-based politics, racial
discord, and Anglo-American intervention, which will be further developed in subsequent
chapters and explain how colonization created the societal characteristics which framed
decolonization in British Guiana. Politics in British Guiana in the late colonial period was
intricately connected to organized labor unions. These unions were formed as a result of
relationships fostered in worker movements during episodes of economic crisis, specifically in
11
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the 1930s. Popular labor movements were a necessary outgrowth of colonial social structures
which limited suffrage and forced the majority of the population to seek political voice through
means other than a democratic vote. The liberal nature of international labor movements in the
1920s and 1930s left a permanent impression on Guianese political leaders seeking selfgovernment. Similar peculiarities of colonial society impacted race relations, international
affairs, and economic development. These themes will be developed in this chronology of
Guianese history in such a manner that they can be properly understood when drawn upon in
subsequent chapters of this work.
The road to autonomous government in British Guiana was marred by a legacy of
violence and racial conflict, often described as a phenomenon which “enflamed” the colony. Fire
is literally and figuratively a fitting analogy for the events which preceded the establishment of
an autonomous government in the colony. Literally, arson played a prominent role in the racial
warfare which poisoned Georgetown and razed East Indian villages in 1962, 1963, and 1964.3
Fire is even more useful as a metaphor to explain the eventual strife which plagued British
Guiana. Three elements are necessary for a fire to burn: fuel, heat, and an igniter. British
Guiana’s colonial history provided 130 years of tension between Afro-Guianese and East
Indians. Colonial structures compounded antagonisms between the two largest ethnic groups in
the colony and provided ample fuel for conflict. A small, but prominent upper-middle class of
white merchants only added to the explosive mix of ethnic rivalry in the colony. Geo-strategic
Cold War imperatives framed the Anglo-American perspective on how decolonization would
occur in the British West Indies. The result was an increasingly rigid structure within which
3
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Guianese were forced to work. Outside influences heated up an already tense situation in the
British Guiana. The ultimate catalyst which ignited the flames of racial warfare came from the
politically opportunistic leadership of key Guianese nationalist leaders, especially Cheddi jagan
and Forbes Burnham. Those politicians spoke to embedded fears warning that cultural
subjugation would be the consequence if either ethnic group lost the election. The evolution of
Guianese society made for a volatile situation as the colony prepared for self-government. This
chapter will survey the historical background which led up to this volatile situation.
Initial European Colonization and the Development of a Sugar Economy
The early history of Guyana, like most European colonies in the Caribbean, was defined
by two main characteristics: sugar and African slaves.4 Most of the area which today comprises
the nation of Guyana was initially settled in 1621 by the Dutch West India Company. The Dutch
established small colonies primarily located along the coastal belt, about three or four miles from
the sea.5 Less than one hundred Europeans populated the Essequibo colony at the beginning of
the eighteenth-century, and the population remained consistent until the West India Company
opened the region to British settlers in the middle of the eighteenth-century. The population
surged upward as British planters from neighboring Caribbean islands immigrated to the region
during the last half of the eighteenth-century in search of fertile soils.6 Between 1781 and 1803
European wars shifted control of the colony between The Netherlands, Great Britain, and France.
In 1803 Great Britain established rule over the colony permanently and that authority was
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ratified at the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. In 1831 the British unified their holdings in the region as
the colony of British Guiana in the geographical structure that it holds today.7
Colonial Guianese society was dominated by a sugar plantation based economic system
throughout the nineteenth-century. The labor intensive cash crop was the catalyst for the influx
of racially diverse workers during the period. Initially the British found their primary source of
labor in African slaves; however, the reformation of slave laws in the British Empire during the
early to mid nineteenth-century, and subsequent abolition of slavery and the apprenticeship
system in the 1830s, created a demand for alternative sources of low-cost labor. The majority of
freed slaves in British Guiana refused to become wage laborers working for their former masters
and migrated to the towns and villages, gradually becoming an urban proletariat.8 It was under
these transformational circumstances that British planters sought salvation from their labor
shortage problem. The planters’ deliverance came with the importation of multitudes of
indentured servants from across the globe. Immigrant laborers, in theory would work for an
agreed upon number of years, usually five.9 However, wealthy planters strong armed workers,
manipulated colonial laws, and benefited from lax application of Colonial Office trusteeship over
servants. As a result, most indentures found themselves bound to plantations in slave-like
conditions after their period of servitude expired.10 The majority of indentured workers were
migrants from Britain’s jewel colony, India, and smaller numbers of indentured workers
immigrated from Portugal and China as well, transforming the colony into an enclave of eclectic
cultures on the mainland of South America.11 About 30,000 Portuguese immigrated to the
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colony, most arriving between the abolition of apprenticeship in 1838 and 1860. Chinese
workers numbered about 14,000 and entered the colony primarily from 1850-1870. In addition,
about 240,000 East Indians were imported into British Guiana between1838 and 1917.12 The
sugar plantation system turned the colony into a monocrop economy that was hard to diversify
once sugar prices collapsed. Additionally, the system of indentured servitude framed
immigration to the colony and the demographic segregation of Guianese society along ethnic
lines.
Immigration and Social Development
The early development of the colony established the basis for its social evolution during
the ensuing century and into the independence period. Indentured servitude provided the impetus
for multi-cultural immigration but did not create an integrated society. Workers received passage
to British Guiana in exchange for an agreement to work for five years, primarily on one of the
colony’s sugar plantations. Indentures had the option to obtain an industrial residence upon the
expiration of required service until 1862 when the Court of Policy established reindenture for a
period of five years to quell competition with the free labor market. Immigrant laborers were
virtually imprisoned on the estates to which they were bound as a result of such modifications to
colonial policy. High levels of immigration continued until the combination of a numerically
significant labor force and the world sugar crisis of 1894-95 decreased the need for additional
cheap labor in the colony. By the mid-1890s there were enough poor laborers in British Guiana
for planters to establish a system of cheap wage labor, thus ending the indenture system in the
colony.13 East Indians’ desire to retain cultural traditions and their economic dependence on
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plantation owners left them isolated from the rest of Guianese society. The structural isolation of
East Indian indentures was the first of several examples of colonial systems segregating the
ethnic communities of the British Guiana.
Despite racial and cultural diversity, immigrant groups formed communities based on
ethnic affiliation and employment was organized along racial lines. The majority of Portuguese
and Chinese workers moved into towns and villages to pursue retail trades upon the completion
of their period of servitude and the Chinese especially assimilated well into the existing
European culture of the urban areas. The Portuguese community suffered through periods of
antagonism from other cultural groups because of their Roman-Catholic heritage. Additionally,
the indebted lower classes occasionally blamed Portuguese retailers for price hikes during
periods of economic stagnation, leading to anti-Portuguese riots in 1856, 1889, and 1905.14 The
majority of the East Indian population in British Guiana, however, remained based in rural areas
hoping to preserve cultural traditions and become independent land owners through rice
cultivation.15
The two largest ethnic groups were those of African and East Indian origin. AfroGuianese and East Indians developed quite separate cultures despite the limited geographical size
of the colony and its few population centers. In addition to the system of indenture, cultural
exchange was limited by other colonial structures, specifically the colonial educational system.
Great Britain mandated compulsory education for the Guianese in 1876 based on Christian run
schools. Consequently, there was virtually no enforcement of the law in regards to East Indians,
who resided predominantly on sugar estates and developed a segregated society based on
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traditional Hindu or Muslim cultures. Therefore, the Afro-Guianese population established an
urban based culture centered on education, Christian religion, and a moderate conformity to
British norms and values. In contrast, East Indians resided principally in rural areas where they
worked in sugar fields and after 1900 began cultivating rice. Many East Indians obtained small
amounts of Crown land from settlement schemes designed to entice them to remain in the colony
after their period of servitude expired, while others remained as wage workers on large sugar
plantations.16 Lack of education, and strong familial ties, limited the ability of East Indians to
migrate to urban areas.17 Other structural characteristics of the British colonial system worked in
conjunction with the educational laws to further develop what has frequently been defined as a
pluralistic society.18 The mining industry, for example, existed outside the spectrum of
indentured labor, drawing its workers from the displaced Afro-Guianese community. A
considerable number of former slaves became prospectors, or worked as laborers for the small
industry of the colony. These individuals were paid in cities and, despite working in the interior,
congregated in towns and villages, slowly acquiring small pieces of property and establishing a
unique urban culture.19 British Guiana’s racial demographics and its occupational and social
segregation framed the colony’s political evolution. East Indians were disenfranchised for most
of the colony’s history, despite being the largest ethnic group in British Guiana and the East
Indian community was fiercely loyal to Cheddi Jagan when he emerged a political leader.20
Additionally, occupational segregation meant that the pursuit of a political agenda directed at
improving conditions for field workers or urban laborers inherently resulted in alignment with a
specific ethnic group.
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Despite the development of several distinct ethnic cultures, racial conflict in British
Guiana was less violently pervasive than in other culturally diverse societies, such as the United
States. Open interracial conflict was uncommon in the colony, though as mentioned, there were
persistent antagonisms in Guianese society, which occasionally surfaced in episodes such as the
anti-Portuguese riots and intermittent Afro-Guianese-East Indian violence. Cultural rivalry was
manifested in intense disdain between the Afro-Guianese and East-Indian communities and
struggle was endemic, though generally non-violent prior to the independence period.21 The
segregated nature of Guianese society may have acted as a veil through which passionate ethnic
rivalry was obscured by structural separation. Self-government demanded a more integrated
society and Guianese leaders increasingly exploited racial issues for political advantage as the
colony neared independence.
Venezuelan Boarder Dispute
International conflicts during the colonial period also contributed to the complexity of the
independence process in British Guiana. Transfers of European rule in British Guiana during the
eighteenth century resulted in confusion over the ill defined regional borders. In 1895 a long
standing Venezuelan territorial claim of the Essequibo region threatened to erupt into a full-scale
international crisis when the United States moved to support the Venezuelan position as a means
of affirming its own growing influence in the Caribbean. Great Britain asserted its right to the
region based on Dutch secession of the territory in the Treaty of Vienna in 1815.The Essequibo
region was meagerly inhabited; but it comprised nearly two-thirds of British Guiana and was
believed at the time to be rich in a plethora of minerals; specifically, gold, copper, and iron-ore,
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as well as potentially containing coastal oil deposits.22 Venezuela and Great Britain agreed to
submit to international arbitration and the United States appointed a committee to resolve the
matter. The council appointed to decide the matter was composed two judges from the United
States and two from Great Britain and was presided over by a representative from Russia. 23 The
decision strongly favored Great Britain, making the entire ordeal appear to have been a political
play by the United States. Venezuela received Point Barima, the Orinoco River mouth, and 3,000
miles in the interior while Great Britain was awarded 50,000 square miles of the territory when
the decision was handed down.24 The Venezuelan congress was unsatisfied with the arbitration
and despite the fact that they accepted the commission’s findings in 1905; intermittent
diplomatic protests were voiced in Caracas over the ensuing half-century, culminating in a
Special Political Committee in the United Nations in 1962.25 The diplomatic instability resulting
from the dispute would have implications for British Guiana’s independence during the 1960s
and eventually led to armed conflict after Guyana’s independence.26
Colonial Economics in the Early Twentieth Century
British Guiana’s economic development contributed significantly to its social and
political evolution. By the early twentieth century, a disproportionate amount of influence in
British Guiana was held in the hands of a small number of large western companies. The First
World War served as the catalyst for the investment of American and Canadian companies in the
bauxite mining industry in the British West Indian colonies, primarily British Guiana and
Jamaica. The interests of these companies became crucial during the Second World War and
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their importance grew further with the increasing tension of the Cold War in the 1950s. The
Truman Administration passed NSC-68 in 1950, outlining a new, aggressive American strategy
for conducting the Cold War and bauxite, the mineral used to make aluminum, was an essential
component of the American military buildup. Additionally, the onset of the Korean War in 1950
further increased the American demand for aluminum.27 The Demerara Bauxite Company of
Canada and Reynolds Metals Company, based in the United States, controlled almost all of the
bauxite industry in British Guiana.
The most influential capital investor in British Guiana was Booker Brother’s McConnell
and Company Limited, a British company which established a virtual monopoly on sugar and
plantations, controlling almost eighty-five percent of the arable land in the colony.28 Bookers’
influence was not confined to plantations. The company also operated one of the largest
mercantile enterprises in the colony, including drug stores, shipping lines, manufacturing
companies, and subsidiaries in shrimping, printing, stock feeds, insurance, and distilleries.29 In
his work, Cold War in a Hot Zone, Gerald Horne notes that Booker Brothers wielded such an
influence in the colony that future Guianese Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan once stated:
“[Bookers] are and indeed always have been the real rulers of our country.”30 Stephen Rabe
notes that many Guianese made light of the situation by referring to the colony as “Booker’s
Guiana”. By 1962 Bookers was the primary source of income for 100,000 people, almost a fifth
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of the population.31 The global economic crisis in 1894-95, and again in the 1930s, led to a
decline in sugar prices and a subsequent increase in the importance of rice and bauxite to British
Guiana. However, the diversity of Bookers’ investments ensured the company’s prominence in
the colony into the independence period. The economic monoculture and social segregation
fermented in British Guiana from 1815-1950 helped frame the independence process from 19501966.
Organized Labor and Political Evolution
Social conditions in British Guiana severely restricted political involvement in the colony
and led to the rise of organized labor as the primary conduit for political voice as was
characteristic of most of the British Caribbean. Thus, the intricacies of workers’ movements
defined the trajectory of political development in the colony. Property requirements limited the
voting population to a miniscule 4,300 individuals in 1915. Additionally, suffrage was entirely
disproportionate to population demographics. Sixty percent of registered voters were AfroGuianese, twenty percent British, eleven percent Portuguese, and only six percent East Indian;
despite the fact that East Indians comprised roughly fifty percent of the adult male population.32
As a result, disenfranchised workers attempted to gain a political voice through collective labor
movements. Several attempts were made at collective labor movements in the colony to combat
wartime inflation without success during the 1910s. Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow, an AfroGuianese dock worker, established the first permanent labor union, the British Guiana Labour
Union (BGLU) in 1919 with the assistance of British union leaders.33 Critchlow organized the
“First British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference” in Georgetown in 1926. The
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conference resulted in the formation of the British Guiana and West Indian Labour Federation,
the first regional labor movement. Critchlow’s socialist leanings laid the foundation for the
strong connection between liberal ideals and labor unions, characteristics which defined British
Guianese politics for the next forty years. It is pertinent to note the animosity Critchlow had for
the East Indian community as well as the reality that union based politics contributed to further
racial polarization in Guianese society. Gerald Horne accurately draws a connection between the
marginalization of the East Indian community and the rise of Cheddi Jagan twenty years later.34
Global economic depression during the 1930s was the impetus for the most significant
changes in British Guiana during the mid-twentieth century. Sugar prices fell drastically
resulting in extreme unemployment and decreased wages for already desperately poor field
workers. Labor unrest increased toward the middle of the decade and climaxed in October 1935
when sugar workers walked off of several estates in the colony’s Demerara and Berbice districts.
Striking workers had difficulty obtaining concessions from their employers, however, due to a
lack of effective organization.35 Thus, the establishment of the Manpower Citizen’s Association
(MPCA) in 1936 was a critical development in the political evolution of the colony. The
organization came to be the most powerful representation of sugar workers in British Guiana
during the independence period.36 Cheddi Jagan worked with the MPCA early in his political
career; however, by the late 1940s Jagan determined that MPCA leaders were loyal to Bookers,
rather than the field workers. Jagan began organizing opposition to the MPCA and he helped to
establish the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) as an alternative union for sugar
workers. His measures against the union were the catalyst for some of the most intense violence
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and unrest in the colony during the independence period.37In response to increased political
organization, the British Colonial Office relaxed voting laws during the 1930s, extending
suffrage to a few thousand additional colonists.38
Consequences of the Great Depression and World War II on Colonial Development
The effects of the Great Depression continued to impact the Caribbean forcefully in
1937-38. Consistently decreasing prices of rice, sugar, and bauxite during the decade culminated
in extensive unemployment in the region by the end of the 1930s.39 Caribbean labor
organizations hosted demonstrations in an attempt to improve the situation in the British West
Indies, while organized workers reacted violently as labor unrest shook Trinidad in May 1938.
Repercussions were felt across the British West Indies and beyond. Great Britain passed the
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 in large part because of the consequences of the
economic crisis in the Caribbean during the 1930s. Colonial administrators in Great Britain
feared that protests against poor wages, terrible working conditions, and inadequate housing
would spread to British Guiana and Jamaica through the increasingly interconnected network of
trade unions. In response, the government sent a commission headed by Lord Moyne to the
region in 1938.40 The Moyne Commission found terrible conditions including a serious lack of
educational opportunity, deep poverty, and a rapidly increasing population in the region. The
commission advocated serious economic and social reforms, such as increasing sugar subsidies
and diversifying the economies of the region, as well as an expansion of suffrage for the
colonies. Jason Parker notes crucially that while the importance of political reform was noted,
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the British government made few concessions to the internal governments of the region.41
Despite the intentions of the commission, the outbreak of World War II made investment in the
colonies and attempts at reform impossible for Great Britain for nearly a decade.
World War II also affected the region by drastically increasing the presence of the United
States in British colonies. In 1940 Great Britain and the United States concluded the Destroyers
for Bases Deal, assuring an amplified United States military presence in the region and in
November of that year Franklin Roosevelt sent Charles Taussig to the Caribbean to survey the
region. Taussig drew conclusions similar to those of Lord Moyne; deciding that overpopulation,
disproportionate economic conditions, racial issues, and an abysmal infrastructure made the
region susceptible to pro-Berlin forces.42 It is pertinent to note Taussig’s conclusion that the
region was ripe for subversion simultaneously with his identification of active socialist labor
movements in the region. The end of World War II did not result in an easing of American
apprehension about security issues in the Caribbean. United States policymakers increasingly
feared communist subversion in the region as the Cold War grew more intense. The conclusions
drawn by the Taussig Commission actually became more relevant twenty years after the study.
In 1942 the United States constructed Atkinson Airfield in British Guiana as part of the
Destroyer for Bases Deal.43 The presence of a modern airfield on the South American continent
and the Caribbean rim had implications which far exceeded its purpose during the Second World
War, despite the fact that the base was closed after the Japanese surrender.44 British Guiana came
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to take on a critical role in Anglo-American geo-strategy as the Cold War took the place of
World War II as the primary Western security concern.
Post-War Political Development
During the early 1940s, British Guiana continued to make slow political progress as the
general population became more actively involved in organized labor unions. In 1943 the
constitution was liberalized decreasing the property qualifications for officeholders and further
increasing the number of qualified voters in the colony. Also in 1943, the East-Indian Cheddi
Jagan returned to British Guiana along with his newlywed American wife, the former Janet
Rosenburg, after finishing dental school in the United States.45 The Jagans quickly became a
political force in British Guiana and irreversibly altered the trajectory of the colony’s political
history. Like most East-Indians in British Guiana, Jagan grew up on a sugar estate where his
father worked as a cane-cutter and eventually foreman of a sugar gang.46 Cheddi Jagan had lived
in the United States since 1936 when he left his home to attend Howard University with his
entire family’s savings of $500.47 Jagan had begun to develop strong political views by the time
he returned to the colony, and in 1945 he was sent as British Guiana’s representative to the
newly founded Caribbean Labour Congress.48 In 1946 Cheddi and Janet Jagan formed the
Political Affairs Committee (PAC) with the help of the Afro-Guianese trade unionist Ashton
Chase and H.J.M. Hubbard, a white Marxist.49 Jagan won a seat on the colony’s legislative
council in 1947 after the Colonial Office eased voting requirements increasing the electorate to
60,000. The support of Sidney King, an Afro-Guianese school teacher, was crucial to his victory.
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Janet Jagan and Hubbard unsuccessfully campaigned for seats on the council.50The PAC
attempted to draw from this victory a multi-racial support base to advance an agenda of selfgovernment and universal adult suffrage.51
The PAC was strengthened by its response to labor unrest in the colony in 1948. By the
mid-1940s, the leadership of the MPCA had become corrupted by the interests of Bookers
Brothers and ceased working for the wellbeing of the field workers. Membership dropped from
20,000 in 1940 to 5,000 in 1948.52 There were two primary reasons for the disillusionment of
workers. The first was that the union permitted Bookers to censor the material in the union
periodical. The second was that the union’s expenses were almost entirely covered by
advertisements by Bookers.53 The diminishing influence of the MPCA created a vacuum which
allowed for the emergence of the GIWU, which pursued a more active role attempting to gain
concessions from large sugar cooperatives.54 Throughout the spring, sugar workers organized a
strike incorporating all of the sugar estates on the East Coast of Demerara. Five striking workers
on the Enmore Sugar Estate were killed and another fourteen wounded by police on June 16. The
Jagans responded by organizing a mass march for workers rights.55 The members of the PAC
also began to work on the organization of a political party which they modeled on the
Progressive Party in the United States and Norman Manley’s People’s National Party in Jamaica.
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Cheddi Jagan strengthened his political ties in 1949 when he became head of the Sawmill
Workers Union and most importantly when he met Lyndon Forbes Burnham.56 Like Jagan, the
Afro-Guianese Burnham left the colony to obtain a higher education and graduated from the
University of London in 1947 with a degree in law. During his time in England, Burnham
worked closely with the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in London and fostered ties with the
Communist Party of Great Britain. Before returning to British Guiana in 1949 Burnham helped
the League of Coloured Peoples organize demonstrations against racism in the colonies.57
Burnham set aside the strong sense of Afro-Guianese superiority for which he was known, and
joined with the Jagans to form the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) on January 1, 1950.58 The
organizational structure of the PPP was impressively multi-racial considering the contentious
history of race relations in British Guiana. Both Jagans held prominent positions; Cheddi as party
leader and Janet as general secretary. Forbes Burnham was named party chairman and Sydney
King became assistant secretary. Clinton Wong, of Chinese heritage, was named senior vicechairman.59
In Great Britain, Prime Minister Clement Atlee’s Labour Party began to advance a policy
of guided decolonization throughout the British Empire, progressively granting internal selfgovernment to its colonies to in preparation for independence. In 1950 sent a commission to
British Guiana headed by Dr. E.J. Waddington to assess the state of the colony. The Colonial
Office was concerned about the residual effects of the violence in 1948 as well as the social and
economic issues identified by the Moyne Commission. The Waddington Commission’s
recommendations to the Colonial Office led to important changes in the political structure of
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British Guiana. Universal adult suffrage was extended to the population of the colony,
eliminating previous property and income restrictions in place in 1950. Additionally, a lower
House of Assembly comprised of elected Guianese was added to the colonial legislature within
the colony. The majority of the Executive Council of the colony would be drawn from the House
of Assembly; however, the colonial governor retained veto powers over the colony as well as the
authority to certify elections.60
By 1952 Cheddi and Janet Jagan’s political ideology was becoming a point of concern for
administrators in both Great Britain and the United States as well as within the colonial
governments of the British West Indies. A British report on the PPP in late 1951 noted the
party’s alignment with the CLC and labeled it a socialist party. Consequently, colonial
authorities increasingly restricted the Jagans’ movement throughout the region between 1948 and
1952.61 Trade unions in the United States with strong connections to the American government,
such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO),
and Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), labeled the Jagans communists in 1951. Jay
Lovestone, Secretary-treasurer of the AFL, made the crucial determination that although the
Jagans were communists, elements within the PPP were not so ideologically inclined and
included Burnham in the second group after sanctioning a fact-finding mission on the situation to
British Guiana. That information was passed on to the State Department in Washington D.C.62
The anti-communist organized labor front in the United States became a conduit for the
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American acquisition of intelligence on British Guiana, especially after the United States
consulate was closed in 1953.63
Internal Self-Government and British Resumption of Direct Rule
In April 1953 British Guiana embarked on what seemed to be the beginning of a
transition to independence when Great Britain oversaw the first national election in Guianese
history.64 The results of the election, and the consequences which resulted from the actions of the
PPP in its aftermath, set the precedent for the independence process in the colony. The PPP won
eighteen of twenty-four contested seats in a decisive victory that took the British by surprise. In
an attempt to maintain racial solidarity the party sent three East Indians and three Afro-Guianese
party members as its representatives to the governor’s Executive Council.65The Jagans moved to
implement a number of social reforms in British Guiana in light of the overwhelming nature of
their victory. The PPP targeted support for low-cost housing, workmen’s compensation, land
reform, and public education. Scholars have generally interpreted the measures pursued by the
PPP as relatively modest. However, British officials and contemporary political opposition,
specifically members of the MPCA who were fearful of losing power under a Jagan-led
government, interpreted Jagans moves as an attempt to consolidate support for the PPP and
undermine his political opposition. The MPCA soon began to suggest that the Jagans were
attempting to implement a communist government in the colony.66 The allegations grew when
63

Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 33.
Ibid, 13.
65
Ibid, 38.
66
The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey (hereafter TNA), Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 1031/4405,
Records of the West Indian Department, Note by Alec Douglas-Home, 19 November 1963. Some historians are
skeptical of Jagan’s contemporaries who saw communist undertones in the measures pursued by the PPP in 1953.
See: Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 38-39. Others suggest a more nuanced argument detailing the
political implications of Jagan’s measures, perhaps suggesting that Jagan’s motivation in pursuing such reforms was
not without a specific political agenda beyond social improvement. See: Spinner, A Political and Social History of
Guyana, 43-44.
64

43

the PPP overturned the Undesirable Publications Act which banned subversive literature,
creating a legal means for the PPP distribution of communist literature in the colony.
In September 1953 the GIWU called a nationwide sugar strike halting production of the
colony’s chief form of revenue.67 Jagan hoped to use the strike to argue for the necessity of a
Labour Relations Bill to expand workers rights by permitting laborers to certify unions of choice
and decertify existing unions. If the bill was passed the PPP could use it as the legal structure for
the GIWU to supplant the MPCA, diminish the power of Bookers in the colony, and consolidate
support for the PPP among the sugar workers.68 Lionel Luckhoo, head of the MPCA and
instigator of the previously overturned Undesirable Publications Act, was outraged. As a
consequence of the attempted reform the colony became mired in open political warfare.69
British officials became increasingly concerned that the PPP was orchestrating a communist
takeover and British troops landed on October 4 to establish order. The bill passed on October 8
and on October 9 Governor Alfred Savage suspended the constitution and took direct control of
the colony. 70 The main thrust of British opposition to the internal government was aimed at the
Jagans. While the Colonial Office distrusted Forbes Burnham and other PPP leaders, no one in
British Guiana was considered as much of a threat as Cheddi and Janet Jagan in 1953.
Sir James Robertson headed the British Parliamentary Commission sent to investigate the
1953 crisis in British Guiana. The Robertson Commission’s conclusions were released in late
1954. The commission drew that same conclusion that the official Parliamentary report, or White
Paper, had the previous year, determining that the PPP was comprised of a “very powerful
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communist element” lead by the Jagans. 71 The commission also concluded that the Jagans
“unreservedly accepted the classical communist doctrines of Marx and Lenin and were
supporters of the most modern communist movements.” Meanwhile, Robertson classified
Burnham as a moderate social democrat, opposed to British rule, but not communist.72 The
commission placed the blame for the suspension of the constitution squarely on the PPP and did
not set a timeframe for the restoration of self-government in the colony. Finally, the commission
foresaw increasing racial confrontations as the growing East Indian population asserted control
over the Afro-Guianese of the colony.73
The suspension of the constitution in 1953 set in motion a series of events that redefined
the political scene in British Guiana. Governor Savage attempted to assert control in the colony
by minimizing the influence of the Jagans. Cheddi Jagan was sentenced to six months of hard
labor after violating a travel ban imposed on him and his wife by the Governor. Janet was
imprisoned five months later for conducting a public meeting and being in possession of an
illegal Police Riot Manual. Simultaneously, fissures began to develop within the PPP. Moderate
party members thought Jagan’s policies were responsible for the suspension of the constitution
and attempted to redefine the party’s ideological positions. Unable to reconcile their differences,
the party split into competing and increasingly contentious camps. Jagan held together many of
the traditional leaders of the party, crucially maintaining the support of the Afro-Guianese
Ashton Chase, Sydney King and Martin Carter. Burnham fronted the opposition, a moderate
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group of politicians including Clinton Wong and the East Indian Jai Narine Singh.74 Jagan and
Burnham understood the critical importance of maintaining a multi-racial base of support and
worked tirelessly to win the approval of both East Indians and Afro-Guianese. Both men
managed to retain multi-racial support initially, but that victory was short lived.
The PPP splintered further in late 1956. The swift and conclusive British response to
reformatory policies in 1953 convinced Cheddi Jagan that it would be necessary to approach
change within the colony more cautiously. He moderated his stance on several issues and was
vaguely critical of the rhetoric of individuals in the party three years prior. His altered
perspective, especially his decision not to pursue inclusion in the proposed West Indies
Federation, alienated several key members of his faction of the PPP and ended his alliance with
King and Carter.75 It is somewhat unclear whether Jagan expelled King and Carter upon the
urging of the British or if they chose to leave the party on their own. Regardless of the
circumstances, by the end of the year the political situation had degenerated into increasingly
racially segregated party alliances.
The Development of Racial Politics in British Guiana
The United States returned its consulate to British Guiana in 1957 just as Great Britain
was preparing to return partial sovereignty to the colony. The Colonial Office eliminated the
restrictions placed on the Jagans upon the repeated suggestion of Governor Patrick Renison and
prepared the colony for the elections to be held in August. Meanwhile, colonial politicians
increasingly appealed to loyalty based on ethnicity. The PPP initially used the expression “Apan-
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Jhaat”, or vote for your own, in the East Indian community.76 Leo Despres explains that properly
contextualized the expression encouraged cooperation between people of similar cultural values.
The slogan did not have an explicit racial connotation in its initial manifestation; rather it was a
means of identifying certain nationalistic ideals. However, it came to be understood by many
within the Afro-Guianese community and especially British and American observers as an
expression of divisive racial politics.77 Internal self-government returned to British Guiana in
August 1957 with the PPP again dominating the elections, establishing Cheddi Jagan as the most
viable political figure in the colony. In response, Forbes Burnham announced the formation of a
new political party, the People’s National Congress (PNC) after the election, acknowledging
Jagan’s leading role in the PPP.78
The increasingly racial aspect of politics in British Guiana has held a place of primacy in
traditional explanations for the degeneration of the nationalist movement in the decade prior to
independence. Scholars have shown that racial identification became increasingly connected
with identification to specific political parties after the Jagan-Burnham split in 1955. However,
Rishee Thakur postulates that ideological differences were the most significant factor in the
schism in the PPP and the further fragmentation of the Guianese movement.79 He argues that the
disintegration of the PPP in 1955 was a left-right split, based on the need to formulate a new
political agenda after the suspension of the Constitution in 1953. The inability of the party
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leaders to collaborate on a new strategy led to the split, followed by realignment of their
supporters. 80 Gordon Oliver Daniels suggests that Jagan pursued domestic policies which
inherently benefited the East Indian community after the PPP victory in 1957. Daniels suggests
that even if the policies were not racist in design, they were in effect.81 However, Thakur notes
that irreconcilable racial differences within the nationalist movement were not evident until at
least 1959, suggesting that racial tensions during the 1950s and 1960s were not predetermined.82
It is also pertinent to acknowledge the individual political rivalry between Jagan and
Burnham and the debate over British Guiana’s future participation ion in the proposed West
Indies Federation. Both Jagan and Burnham had strong personalities and harbored intensions of
being the father of Guyana. Their rivalry in itself contributed greatly to the schism in the party.83
Finally, increasing racial tensions were exacerbated by the debate over whether British Guiana
would join the West Indies Federation. The Afro-Guianese community welcomed the
opportunity to establish a closer relationship with the predominantly black Caribbean nations,
such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. East Indian Guianese feared that association with the
Caribbean nations would lead to migration of blacks to Guiana, and a marginalization of the East
Indian community.84Thus, as British Guiana neared independence, its two most important
political leaders pursued opposing policies on the critical issue of alliance with the West Indies
Federation, based on racial prerogatives and increasingly engaged in racial politics.
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The Impact of the Cuban Revolution in British Guiana
Cheddi Jagan pursued moderate policies and attempted to foster economic progress
through interaction with the United States and Great Britain after the election of 1957. However,
he also promoted policies aimed at linking the interests of the East Indian community with those
of all British Guiana, exacerbating the tensions between the East Indian and Afro-Guianese
communities.85 Unfortunately for Jagan, the Americans were increasingly preoccupied with the
events in Cuba. The United States believed Fidel Castro to be a moderate reformer and supported
the Cuban Revolution in its early years. However, after taking over the seat of government in
Havana in 1959, the Cubans moved toward alignment with the Soviet Union and the Eastern
Bloc. Consequently, the United States’ was staunchly opposed to further social movements in the
hemisphere and grew even more skeptical of reformist regional leaders. Consecutive American
administrations came to understand British Guiana in terms of their experience with Castro in
Cuba. The PPP misinterpreted the consequences of Castro’s success and attempted a similar,
aggressive foreign policy, increasingly opposing the United States. In April 1960 Cheddi and
Janet Jagan visited Cuba and met with Cuban leaders. The Jagans hoped that a show of support
for the Cuban Revolution would provide a boon in negotiating for financial aid and economic
deals, specifically the sale of rice to Cuba. Meanwhile, the Jagans continued to pursue relations
with the Soviet bloc and rhetorically support Marxist ideology.86 Cheddi Jagan’s actions
solidified the American opposition to his leadership of the colony upon independence.
Great Britain was considerably less skeptical of the threat posed by Castro and Cuba;
however, preserving Anglo-American cooperation was a primary concern for the British. Despite
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serious disagreements and occasionally contentious exchanges about the situation in British
Guiana, the United States and Great Britain formulated a coordinated policy for the colony. After
John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency of the United States in January 1961, supporting a
staunch policy of anti-communism, both nationalist leaders and colonial governors in British
Guiana were forced increasingly to consider the impact of American influence on British plans
for decolonization.
Racial Violence, Anglo-American Intervention, and the Progression to Independence
The stability of British Guiana began to decay as the colony prepared for another round
of national elections in August 1961. Stephen Rabe notes that 1961 was a year of hope for the
colony. There was relative peace and the promise that the colony would soon be independent.87
Jagan and the PPP again were victorious in the elections and the British prepared to grant the
colony independence sometime in mid-1962.88 However, racial politicking had been a growing
factor in Guianese politics, and drastically increased as the elections approached. Ethnic rivalry
in the colony would prove to be an ominous sign of events soon to follow. Burnham and the
PNC were not content to watch idly as the Jagans and the PPP led the colony to independence.
They began organizing a vocal opposition against the Jagans, eventually with financial and
strategic support from the United States.
The fate of Cheddi Jagan lay potentially in a visit he made to the United States in October
1961. Jagan was given a spot on the weekly political television news program Meet the Press
and slated for an audience with President Kennedy, despite strong resistance from anticommunist hard-liners in the White House. Kennedy had at least verbally agreed to make an
87
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effort to work with Jagan after the elections in September.89 The October visit provided Jagan
with a much needed opportunity to foster beneficial relations with the United States and obtain
economic aid crucial for development if the colony was to successfully prepare for
independence. Scholars have interpreted Jagan’s visit in several ways; however, the most
complete explanation is put forth by James McDonald. McDonald explains that in August 1961
several prominent members of the Kennedy Administration, along with the President, decided
upon a two-track approach to British Guiana. The first track was used as a manner of placating to
British primacy in the colony. It advocated accepting Jagan and minimally cooperating, while
“play[ing] political hardball”, in an effort to convince Jagan to pursue alignment with the West.
The second track, advanced in conjunction with the first, was to unleash the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in the colony and pursue a broad program of subversion, aimed at exploiting
Jagan’s vulnerabilities and undermining his government by raising questions about his ability to
govern in an independent Guyana. Theoretically the second track would be called off if Jagan
chose to reconcile with the Anglo-American camp and renounce his communist ideals and
support for Cuba.90
Jagan’s visit conclusively undermined any opportunity he had of averting American
intervention, if in fact he had a chance at all. His interaction with broadcaster Lawrence Spivak
on Meet the Press was disastrous. Spivak attacked Jagan for his ideological views, drawing the
Guianese leader into a philosophical debate which destroyed his credibility to the American
public. It is unlikely that the Kennedy Administration would have worked with Jagan unless he
agreed to sever ties with Cuba. Jagan’s performance on Meet the Press alone nearly sealed his
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fate.91 Independence for British Guiana during the Cold War would depend in large part on the
ability of the colonial leaders to foster cooperative relations with Great Britain and the United
States. Jagan’s position as the preeminent politician in British Guiana began to erode quickly
after his trip to the United States.
The domestic environment in British Guiana for the next three years was characterized by
violence. Endemic racial animosity which had been held at bay for nearly a decade exploded in
the capital city of Georgetown after Cheddi Jagan’s budget proposed a restructured tax system
which would include several new taxes and a compulsory savings plan. Levies were proposed on
capital gains, property, and gifts. A duty proposed on total sales, intended to minimize the ability
of firms to avoid income tax by claiming losses each year, was especially incendiary to
businessman.92 The business community interpreted the scheme to be a redistribution of wealth
that was anti-capitalist and argued forcefully against the plan.93 Opposition to the budget was not
limited to upper class businessmen. The Trades Union Council (TUC), a collective comprised of
most of the Guianese labor organizations, also opposed portions of the budget. Specifically, the
TUC disproved of the compulsory savings plan in which the government would take a
percentage of salaries over $100 a month and self-employed persons incomes in exchange for
government bonds. Additionally, the TUC opposed taxes on luxuries, alcohol and tobacco.94 The
Jagans’ political foes took advantage of the widespread opposition to his proposals. Realizing
that they could not defeat Jagan at the polls, Forbes Burnham, Peter D’Aguiar, the Portuguese
head of the United Front (UF), and union leader Richard Ishmael took their political opposition
to the streets as Afro-Guianese mobs attacked East Indians, burned their businesses and looted
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stores. Seven blocks of the business section of the city burned, and the economy spiraled into a
steep decline.95
In the United States, most of the high level correspondence on British Guiana remains
classified. However, the consensus among respected historians is that the CIA, at the behest of
President Kennedy, provided financial assistance for approximately 40,000 striking civil service
workers in an effort to undermine Cheddi Jagan.96 Stephen Rabe suggests that the CIA used
international labor unions as a cover to send financial aid to Burnham.97 Ultimately, the domestic
crisis compounded the foreign policy issues Jagan’s administration was facing and raised further
questions about Jagan’s ability to head an independent Guyana. The scheme almost worked as
Jagan’s government only survived the crisis when British troops arrived to re-establish order in
the colony two days after the violence had begun.98
The Kennedy Administration responded to the unrest in British Guiana by stepping up its
pressure on British policymakers for eliminating Jagan as head of the Guianese government. In
February 1962 United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk told British Foreign Secretary Lord
Alexander Home that the United States would not accept an independent Guyana led by Jagan.
He insisted that action had to be taken to avert granting independence until a new government
could be placed in office. Rusk’s statement elicited a strong response from British officials who
were surprised, angered, and offended by the suggestion that they should subvert a
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democratically elected government in their colony.99 A series of forceful correspondences were
fired back and forth across the Atlantic asserting the inability of the United States to “put up with
an independent British Guiana under Jagan” and the astonishment of the British at the
Americans’ “Machiavellianism”.100 Despite considerable animosity toward the hubris of United
States officials, Prime Minister Macmillan and the British Government slowly consented to
American demands. The independence conference scheduled for May was postponed until
October and when it finally took place, there was no discussion of independence.101
Tensions remained high into the early months of 1963 and Georgetown was riddled with
violence once again, after Jagan passed a labor relations bill intended to ensure workers’ ability
to endorse unions of their choice. In mid-April, MPCA and TUC leader Richard Ishmael called
for a general strike in the colony. The TUC feared that the bill was a cloak for the PPP to
neutralize the influence of the MPCA, which had long represented the colony’ sugar workers,
and was opposed to Jagan. The TUC suggested that if the bill passed, the PPP would make the
Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU), which was loyal to Jagan, the official union of
Guianese sugar workers.102 British Guiana was still suffering the damage incurred from the
violence of the previous year and the strike further ravaged the economy. Even more devastating
to Jagan’s position was the inclusion in the strike of a substantial portion of the Civil Service
Association. Most of the civil services were manned by Afro-Guianese who had become
politically polarized by the racial nature of politics in the colony. The degradation of essential
services in British Guiana led to food and oil shortages and by May 9 a state of emergency was
99

Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 93-94.
Memorandum from Rusk to Home FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:544-545.
101
Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 98; Spinner, 99-100.
102
TNA, CO 1031/4493, Records of the West Indian Department, Note by Colonial Office Information Department:
British Guiana Conference Failure of 1962 Deliberations: The Interest Taken by the United Nations, 22 October
1963.
100

54

declared by the colonial governor, Sir Ralph Grey. 103 The strike ended on July 8; however, over
the subsequent eighteen months, hundreds of Guianese became victims of the racial violence
which continued unabated as a consequence of the decimated economy.104 Burnham continued to
strengthen his ties to the United States in early May by visiting the United States and meeting
with several prominent leaders within the Kennedy Administration, including Arthur
Schlesinger, Special Advisor to the President. Burnham argued his case to government officials
as well as the general public and garnered considerable support before returning to British
Guiana.105
Stephen Rabe effectively describes the critical role of American covert assistance in
financing Jagan’s opposition. However, it is pertinent to note that Burnham and D’Aguiar were
opportunistic politicians who would likely have exploited the conditions of racial animosity
which existed since the mid-nineteenth century regardless of United States intervention, though
it is likely that American assistance significantly increased their effectiveness. Additionally, the
United States was not responsible for the disproportionately large percentage of Afro-Guianese
who made up the armed civil services. It is important to acknowledge that the United States
contributed greatly to Jagan’s opposition and unquestionably hastened the elimination of the
PPP; however, it is overly simplistic to attribute the racial violence of the independence period to
the actions of the United States. Thus, American assistance provided the heat that intensified the
fires of tension caused by cultural and social conditions, and ultimately ignited racial warfare as
a consequence of the politics of opportunistic Guianese politicians.
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The British Guiana Constitutional Conference, held in October 1963, proved to be the
coup de grace for Cheddi Jagan. It was clear that discussions between Jagan, Burnham, and
D’Aguiar were pointless. The cooperation between the AFL-CIO and Guianese labor unions led
Burnham and D’Aguiar to accurately conclude that the United States would support their efforts
against Jagan and eliminated the necessity of compromise between the PPP and the emerging
PNC/UF coalition. Jagan responded to the stalled negotiations surrounding the proposed new
electoral scheme of proportional representation by appealing to the virtue of the British, asking
Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys to arbitrate and resolve the deadlock.106 Burnham and
D’Aguiar adamantly supported a new system of proportional representation, which increased the
possibility of success for a coalition between the two, over the traditional “first past the post”
system which favored the population advantage of the East Indians and the PPP. They also
vehemently opposed Jagan’s proposal to lower the voting age to eighteen which would have
proven a boon to the PPP because of the large population of East Indians between eighteen and
twenty-one. Sandys decided in favor of Burnham and D’Aguiar on both issues and called for
new elections in November 1964, essentially assuring that a PNC/UF coalition would lead the
colony to independence if they could cooperate during the upcoming year.107
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Domestic unrest in British Guiana worsened in the early months of 1964 as East Indian
sugar workers and staunch PPP supporters took to the streets in response to Sandys’ decision. On
May 25 Afro-Guianese mobs, retaliating for the mutilation of a black couple, descended on the
East Indian village of Wismar raping and pillaging the local population. Over 1,800 people were
left homeless as a result of the violence. Despite pleas for assistance, the Afro-Guianese police
force failed to control the situation. Janet Jagan resigned her position as Minister of Home
Affairs on May 22 in response. She alleged that the police force was no longer operating under
the authority of the government and was in fact a tool of the PNC. Cheddi Jagan refused to name
a successor to the position as a way of supporting his wife and making a political statement.108
On May 27 the new colonial governor, Richard Luyt, declared a state of emergency in the
colony. The violence was far from over and political warfare continued at a heightened intensity.
Statistics of the year’s political violence are telling. Over 200 Guianese died and more than 800
were wounded in 368 racially motivated conflicts during 1964. Some 13,000 Guianese found
themselves refugees, most victims of one of the 1,600 cases of arson.109 Neither side seemed
likely to concede in the midst of the destruction. In fact, the brutality begat only more hostility.
Forbes Burnham’s response was a reminder that he controlled the Afro-Guianese population and
consequently the majority of the armed police force, concluding that his supporters could: “do
more killing than [East Indians] could.”110 Once again the violence was only halted by the
deployment of British troops to the colony.111
The Colonial Office scheduled elections for December 7 and the United States
government worked diligently to ensure that Cheddi Jagan would not be victorious at the polls.
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The AFL-CIO financed anti-Jagan organized labor, primarily in the MPCA, and ran a
disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting Jagan. The CIA added to the propaganda
operation and organized opposition parties in an attempt to fragment East Indian loyalties,
simultaneously advising the PNC and UF and helping them to organize more efficiently. 112 The
British acquiesced to the American tactics, despite strong assertions of opposition to American
influence and to proportional representation voiced by the Labour Party in Great Britain.113
The election unfolded as the United States and Great Britain had planned. The PPP won
more seats than the PNC or UF, but did not obtain the majority which would have given them
charge of the government. Governor Luyt requested Burnham and D’Aguiar form a coalition
government after an Order in Counsel from London removed Jagan from office.114 The United
States approved grants to support the coalition within two weeks of its electoral victory, while
making it clear to Great Britain that assistance was conditional on Jagan being kept out of any
coalition. United States Consul, Delmar Carlson, began advising Burnham and D’Aguiar during
1965 and the Americans pressured Great Britain to grant independence now that Jagan was out
of power. 115
In Great Britain, the Colonial Office and Foreign Office debated throughout the first half
of 1965 about the future of British Guiana. The Colonial Office was determined to see
progression toward racial cooperation in the colony before granting independence, while the
Foreign Office was focused on nurturing the Anglo-American alliance. These competing
objectives were complicated by the political rivalry between Burnham and Jagan. Both Guianese
leaders made it clear that they were unwilling to work toward any alliance or unification so long
112
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as their opponent was included in the government. The Colonial Office conceded that realistic
racial reconciliation was unattainable in the near future and international pressure for the British
to leave the colony was increasing. Labour Party Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, agreed and
determined to convene an independence conference on November 2. The British and Americans
either took Burnham at his word that he would work to create a racially integrated society in
independent Guyana or they turned a blind eye. Burnham refused to set quotas for civil service
employees and made no tangible effort to improve the inequalities in the colony, offering only
vague rhetoric suggesting that he would attempt to improve the situation.116 The AngloAmerican alliance sacrificed racial collaboration for Cold War imperatives by setting a date for
independence without confronting structural issues certain to result in repression of the East
Indian population.
The independence period in British Guiana was defined by racial violence and foreign
intervention. Domestically, the impact of colonization, both its influence on immigration and
social structures, provided the kindling which fueled racial conflict amongst the populace. The
geo-strategic importance of the region during the Cold War, examined in detail in the following
chapter, led to increasing intervention from the United States and limited the ability of the
Guianese to pursue a truly autonomous form of self-government, intensifying the burning
discontent of the Guianese people. The fires of racial warfare were ignited when those
combustible factors combined with the political opportunism and egoism of Cheddi Jagan and
Forbes Burnham, damning British Guiana to a period of intense racial violence and poisoning the
independence process in the colony. The following chapter will explore the strategic imperatives
of the United States and Great Britain in the Caribbean which framed Anglo-American policy in
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British Guiana. The subsequent chapter after that will examine the role of Guianese politicians in
influencing the turn of events which led to the subversion of the PPP government prior to
independence.
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Chapter 3: Anglo-American Cooperation and Strategic Objectives During Decolonization
in British Guiana
The dismantling of the British Empire after 1945 was heavily influenced by the close
Anglo-American relationship which grew out of the Second World War. The United States
began pressing Great Britain to grant independence to its colonial possessions during the war and
by the late 1950s, Great Britain was liquidating its empire.1 However, in the early 1960s, United
States policymakers adjusted their anti-colonial policy as a response to Cold War developments
in the Caribbean, specifically, the Cuban Revolution. American rhetorical support of the right of
self-government in colonial areas was subordinated to its Cold War imperatives and American
policymakers encouraged British intervention in British Guiana’s domestic politics. The
American position shifted toward support for a British policy of slow, closely guided,
decolonization. However, by 1961, economic constraints and strong international opposition to
European colonization led the British to seek a quick withdrawal from British Guiana.2 Thus, in
British Guiana, traditional roles were reversed as Great Britain sought a quick road to Guianese
independence and the United States encouraged a slower approach to decolonization. Both the
United States and Great Britain placed the utmost importance on maintaining their special
relationship during the Cold War, and negotiating a compromise in order to develop a
coordinated policy toward British Guiana was a critical goal of both British and American
officials. Ultimately, racial violence, domestic instability, and ineffective Guianese leadership
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resulted in converging Anglo-American imperatives and the decision by American and key
British officials to intervene in the colony’s domestic politics.
As seen in the previous chapter, British Guiana’s political and socio-cultural development
led to domestic racial conflict, and left-leaning, anti-colonial politics, as the colony progressed
toward independence. Domestic violence in British Guiana and heightened Cold War tensions in
the post-Cuban Revolution Caribbean led to increasing Anglo-American intervention into
Guianese politics. The impact of the Cold War on strategic policymaking in the United States
and Great Britain was one of the key factors impacting the trajectory of Britain’s decolonization,
especially in British Guiana. Anglo-American actions in British Guiana would appear to
contradict rhetorical objectives of those nations in regard to ending colonial rule; however,
British and American decisions in the colony are best understood by examining the
interconnected relationship of the Cold War and decolonization.
This chapter will explore the strategic objectives of the United States and Great Britain in
British Guiana within the context of the Cold War and global decolonization. It will discuss how
Cold War imperatives influenced the relationship between the United States and Great Britain
and how they coordinated a collective strategy in British Guiana. The United States sought to
assure that British Guiana established a stable, anti-communist government, aligned with the
United States, before it was granted independence. Great Britain’s primary goals in British
Guiana were to establish a stable government, capable of quelling racial violence after the
withdrawal of British soldiers from the colony, and maintaining the special relationship with the
United States. Ultimately, the United States determined that its Cold War objectives in the
Caribbean could be met only if Cheddi Jagan and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) were
removed from power in British Guiana. Key British policymakers, specifically Commonwealth
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Secretary Duncan Sandys, also concluded that Jagan and the PPP were incapable of effectively
leading the government. His decision was based on a combination of American pressure and
Jagan’s inability to control domestic violence.3 Thus, the United States and Great Britain came to
a mutual decision to pursue a course to eliminate the PPP government and replace it with a
coalition government between Forbes Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) and Peter
D’Aguiar’s United Front (UF).
Despite scholarly criticism of United States fears in Latin America as overblown, there
existed a legitimate threat of communist infiltration in British Guiana, and a real concern for
instability spreading throughout the region. Scholars such as Richard Barnet and Stephen Rabe
suggest that American policymakers were blinded by a Cold War lens, which doomed them to
misinterpret the intricacies of politics in developing areas.4 Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British
Guiana suggests that American policymakers convinced themselves that Cheddi Jagan would
attempt to turn British Guiana into a replica of Fidel Castro’s Cuba if he were allowed to be the
head of an independent government in British Guiana.5 Rabe notes that high level American
officials based their opposition on circumstantial evidence which led them to draw conclusions
about Jagan that were not corroborated by their British counterparts or even some lower-level
American officials in British Guiana.6 This chapter will expand on the American
contextualization of British Guiana as a key component of Cold War geo-political strategy. It
suggests that American concerns about instability in British Guiana were based on a logical
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assessment of regional Cold War imperatives and domestic unrest in British Guiana itself.
This chapter suggests that the British decision to subvert the PPP cannot simply be
attributed to their acquiescence to American demands. It is not a justification of Anglo-American
intervention; rather, it is a more nuanced explanation for the reasons behind the opposition to
Jagan which led to such a policy. British Guiana is a useful microcosm with which to understand
the complex dynamics involved in developing and instituting a coordinated Anglo-American
foreign policy in the Caribbean. Great Britain toiled diligently in an effort to prepare British
Guiana for independence in a manner that facilitated stability in the colony and enhanced British
standing in the international community. International pressures and fiscal realities demanded the
utmost efficiency and speed from British administrators in granting independence to British
Guiana. This chapter will focus on the broad geo-strategic reasons for the Anglo-American
decision to support Forbes Burnham, rather than Cheddi Jagan, as the individual best suited to
lead the Guianese government during the transition to independence.
Anglo-American strategic imperatives after World War II were framed by the dual
dynamics of the Cold War and global decolonization. In the wake of the Second World War,
many former colonies of European powers rapidly attained sovereignty. The aftermath of the war
also led to the global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. However,
the Cold War and decolonization cannot be understood without considering how each
phenomenon influenced the other. Each newly independent government represented an
ideological and strategic battleground in the struggle for dominance between the Soviet Union
and the Western bloc nations, primarily the Anglo-American alliance of the United States and
Great Britain. Economic alliances, ports, military bases, and raw materials were at stake in each
former colonial area when it gained independence. The Anglo-American alliance and the Soviet
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Union were competing for global influence during a period which saw the world’s political
structures reordered with a totality and speed unparalleled in history. The uncertainty, internal
power struggles and instability inherent in the process of decolonization provided the fertile
ground on which the Cold War was fought, and the Cold War framed the nationalist struggles
which emerged during global decolonization. Thus, the dual dynamics of the Cold War and
decolonization created a global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union,
former colonial powers, and nationalists in the developing world.
It is relevant to consider briefly the global climate during the decolonization period in
British Guiana, defined in this paper as 1953 to 1966, when evaluating British and American
involvement in the colony. Beginning in 1952 and surging forward in early 1953, the Mau Mau
uprising in Kenya stressed to British officials the potential for instability in colonies as they
prepared for independence.7 In July 1953 the Korean War was suspended with the signing of an
armistice between communist North Korea and the Western supported South Korea. There was
no peace treaty signed, however, and the region was still quite volatile. The Korean War
dramatically increased Western fears of communist expansion. Simultaneously, fears of a
communist infiltration in Guatemala resulted in a United States intervention in 1953-54, for
some of the same reasons which caused the British to intervene in British Guiana in 1953;
namely, left-leaning social reforms.8 The Cold War and the decolonization process increased in
intensity throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The interrelation of the two global trends, as this
chapter shows, led to a concurrent increase in British and American concern with the political
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development of British Guiana, reaching a fever pitch during the final stages of decolonization in
the colony.
The Anglo-American Special Relationship
The collaboration between the United States and Great Britain which came to be known
as the special relationship began during World War II. The Allied Nations, specifically the
United States and Great Britain, coordinated policy and military efforts out of necessity to defeat
Nazi Germany, Italy, and imperial Japan during the war. Throughout the war, the AngloAmerican alliance overcame several contentious issues, none more intense than the debate over
the post-war fate of European colonies.9 The United States and Great Britain maintained their
wartime alliance as a deterrent to post-war Soviet expansion. The issue of colonialism,
contentious during the war, resurfaced in its aftermath as the issues which were suspended to
combat the threat at hand emerged with even more force during the early Cold War.
The union forged between Great Britain and the United States emerged from the ashes of
the Second World War altered, but intact, despite severe disagreement on the future of the
British Empire. As the inevitability of decolonization became increasingly apparent, the United
States and Great Britain faced the dual challenge of simultaneously dismantling the British
Empire and waging the Cold War. The role of being the leading global power was no longer the
preserve of Great Britain as it had been prior to World War II. However, the British maintained
considerable input into the global strategy of the Anglo-American alliance during the Cold War,
despite ceding the leadership role to the United States by mid-1943. It is crucial to understand
that neither the United States, nor Great Britain, developed a foreign policy independent of the
9
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other. They maintained a close, though at times contentious alliance, cooperating on most major
issues relating to decolonization and Cold War strategy. The Anglo-American relationship in
British Guiana took a form similar to competing departments within a government. Each
advanced its own interests, within an established framework, and ultimately they formulated a
collective policy. The United States and Great Britain were cognizant of the broad, strategic
imperatives of their trans-Atlantic partnership.
In British Guiana, Cheddi and Janet Jagan posed a serious challenge to British and
American strategic interests during the Cold War and the decolonization of the British West
Indies. Cheddi Jagan was outspoken in his belief in Marxist ideology, and Janet had been an
active communist party member in Chicago before marrying Jagan and moving to British
Guiana. The United States strongly opposed the implications of the Jagans leading a postcolonial Guianese government, especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The British
considered the Cold War implications of post-Castro Caribbean, but were primarily influenced in
their actions by the effect the government would have on preparing the colony for independence.
Great Britain’s concern with Cold War strategy was tempered by the need to establish a popular,
stable government in Guiana. Great Britain, more so than the United States, needed to strike a
balance between Cold War strategy and the realities of decolonization.
The United States was more singularly focused on Cold War imperatives; however, they
took into account British interests, as well as the international consequences for their ally, should
the British acquiesce to American imperatives in the region. United States officials understood
that Great Britain’s primary objective was to leave British Guiana in a quick and dignified
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manner, and they at least considered British aims during the policymaking process.10 British
officials were equally conscious of the American imperatives in the region, such as the
significance of the American relationship with Venezuela.11 Thus, Great Britain and the United
States sought to understand each other’s interests and accommodate them in order to create a
more stable Anglo-American cooperation during the Cold War.
Anglo-American Perspectives in British Guiana
The prism through which the United States and Great Britain interpreted regional events
framed Anglo-American imperatives in the Caribbean. Instability and subsequent violence in the
Congo during its transition to independence, and memories of the partition of India weighed
heavily on British administrators. Cold War perspectives in the United States were greatly
skewed by contemporary experiences with the revolutionary government in Cuba, the geostrategic significance of British Guiana, the economic importance of Venezuela, and were
compounded by the increasing activity of communist parties in the region. Cold War ideology
provided the overarching perspective with which the United States formulated its policy toward
British Guiana. Consequently, Great Britain had to consider the Cold War implications of an
independent Guyana to a much greater degree than other regions of its empire undergoing
decolonization during the decade. The British held a more nuanced understanding of the
subtleties of domestic politics in their colony, as well as of Burnham and Jagan as individuals.
Ultimately, despite harboring deep reservations, they actively supported Burnham, acquiescing
to pressure from the United States.
10
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Vice-President Richard Nixon’s South American tour in 1958 contributed considerably to
how the United States viewed Latin America. Regional opposition to United States policies was
strong, specifically in British Guiana’s western neighbor, Venezuela, where Nixon was attacked
by a mob. American policymakers interpreted the negative response to the Vice President’s trip
within the context of the Cold War. The United States Information Agency concluded that
Nixon’s poor reception was due to the increased influence of the Soviet Union and China, who
the Americans suspected of providing significant material and moral support for regional
communist parties.12 That the most intense opposition to Nixon’s visit occurred in British
Guiana’s western neighbor, Venezuela, was not lost on policymakers in Washington. The United
States State Department noted that legalization of communist parties in Colombia, Venezuela,
and Chile, stimulated similar movements in neighboring countries and that the Communist Party
of Venezuela was: “the most vociferous and fastest-growing legal communist party in the
Western Hemisphere.”13 In the minds of United States policymakers, the presence of active
communist threats in Venezuela and British Guiana reinforced the importance of both areas to
the overarching Cold War strategy.
The Cuban Revolution and the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in Havana in
1959 persuaded the United States to take a more proactive position to assert its aims in the
region. In January 1959 the State Department concluded that the Soviet Union would attempt to
use Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution as a means of undermining the United States position in
Latin America and that the logical response was a more stringent opposition to regional anti12
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American movements.14 The harder line the United States took after 1960 is increasingly evident
in British Guiana. Simultaneously, the success of the Cuban Revolution implanted within United
States policy an ever-present trepidation that further revolutions in the hemisphere could occur.
Cuba’s active role in the exportation of revolution in the early 1960s resulted in an increasingly
strict anti-communist mentality in United States politics.15 The fear that Cheddi Jagan was
another Castro; “a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” dominated the decision making process of
American policy makers as British Guiana marched toward independence in the early 1960’s.16
Ultimately, the Cuban Revolution narrowed the American perception of what constituted
legitimate nationalist movements, specifically in the Western Hemisphere.
United States policymakers interpreted the PPP’s foreign policy, specifically its
communist associations and rhetorical support for the Cuban Revolution, as a clear indication
that American inaction would lead to a second communist government takeover in the
hemisphere, this time on mainland South America.17 While British policymakers were less
confined by Cold War perceptions than their American counterparts, they too acknowledged the
Jagans accumulating ties to international communism. British colonial officials noted, with
concern, the establishment of closed mail bag service with Communist China, the presence of
Venezuelan and Cuban Communists advisors to the PPP, the British Guiana Electricity
Corporation’s decision to purchase fuel exclusively from Cuba, the presence of Cuban rice
14
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vessels in Georgetown, and the flow of Cuban political and technical advisors in and out of the
colony.18 The communist leanings of Cheddi and Janet Jagan and mounting domestic instability
in British Guiana altered the British perspective on how to best withdraw from the colony by
1963, shifting their views closer to those of the United States, who sought to establish a working
relationship with Forbes Burnham.
The most important aspect of American preoccupation with British Guiana was the
colony’s ideological significance. Policymakers in the United States feared that the perception of
having lost a second Western Hemispheric nation to communism would severely damage the
standing of the United States among other Latin America and Caribbean nations. The British,
also concerned with the ideological significance of British Guiana, feared that permitting a
communist government takeover in the colony could set a precedent for other decolonizing areas
where economic ties were considerably more important, such as Singapore. Thus, British Guiana
represented a threat to British control of the decolonization process in their colonies and the
ability to define post-colonial relationships.19 Additionally, British officials feared that if a
communist government in British Guiana nationalized private companies it would lead to further
nationalization within the region, specifically in Britain’s other West Indian colonies. In fact, this
fear was substantiated in 1974 when the former West Indian colonies, led by British Guiana,
nationalized the Caribbean bauxite industry.20
British Guiana held other significance for Great Britain. The British were knee deep in
the dismantling of their empire, and wanted nothing more than to rid themselves of the burden of
18
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what had become an economically draining, politically obstinate West Indian colony. The British
struggled to determine how best to prepare the colony for independence, at the earliest possible
date. Great Britain took pains to preserve a sense of national pride while their empire was being
deconstructed and the British were anxious to achieve a stable and democratic conclusion to their
colonial legacy, specifically in a relatively insignificant territory like British Guiana.21 British
officials were conscious of the potential for violent consequences resulting from prematurely
granting independence, as they had in India, which resulted in ethnic warfare which left millions
dead.22 Thus, British administrators sought to grant independence only when the Guianese were
prepared to maintain a stable self government.
Internal politics within Great Britain and the United States contributed to the
development of the foreign policy objectives of each nation. If British Guiana established a
communist government, the American public likely would perceive the incumbent government
as having lost the country to communism. The domestic political ramifications to the
administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson would have been even more
disastrous than the perceived loss of stature in the international community. British officials were
aware that neither Kennedy nor Johnson could hope to be re-elected if a communist government
was established in British Guiana.23 Deputy Director for the CIA, Richard Helms, wrote to
National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, in July 1964: “when the British inquired what
policy might be should Jagan win, we reiterated that such a situation would be politically
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intolerable in the United States.”24Thus, the strength of American opposition to Jagan made
cooperation between the United States and Great Britain difficult. British leaders were forced to
make concessions to American leadership to maintain the special relationship with the United
States without appearing to kowtow to American interests.
Finally, British imperatives in their colony were framed by fiscal realities. Great Britain
was financially incapable of supporting Guyana’s development alone. Efforts were made to
incorporate the former British Dominion of Canada into British Guiana’s future development
plans on the premise that the Canadians had substantial investments in Guianese bauxite and the
Canadians appear to have shown an interest in exerting influence among former British colonies
in the hemisphere.25 British documents, however, belie a certain realization by the British that
Canadian cooperation could never replace the level of assistance that the United States could
offer. Thus, it was necessary for British officials to appease American policymakers to obtain
financial and material aid from the United States for post-independence development.26
Additionally, British policymakers maintained a certain level of anxiety about the United States
response if Great Britain failed to account for American objectives in British Guiana.27 British
officials maintained a persistent fear that if British Guiana became independent with the PPP and
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Cheddi Jagan in power, the colony could follow a pattern similar to Cuba and result in U.S.
intervention.28
Therefore, despite the pretense on the part of both the British and the United States of the
British developing an independent policy in the colony, the reality was quite different. While the
British formulated plans which assumed disagreement with their North American partner, they
never pursued policies that did not work in conjunction with United States interests in the
region.29 For their part, United States policymakers understood that despite its geographical
proximity to the United States, Guiana was a British colony, and the British would be required to
implement any strategy agreed upon. Internationally, the situation was delicate. Neither nation
wished for it to appear, in the eyes of the international community, as though the United States
was intervening in British-Guianese relations.30
Internal policy, international pressure, and the geographical importance of the colony to
the United States at the height of the Cold War, as well as British pride, made proper
preparations for independence imperative. Neither the United States nor Great Britain would
accept that a former British colony was fated to be an unprepared, unstable, developing nation on
the Caribbean. Great Britain strived to ease racial violence and stabilize the domestic situation
within the colony, and to establish an efficient, functioning government that could avert the
instability and violence that plagued many other post-colonial areas. The United States was
conscious of its partner’s difficult situation. American officials were prepared to consider the
British desire for a rapid transition to Guianese self-government while discussing how to avoid
28
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post-colonial violence, as in the Congo, prior to the United States-United Kingdom talks in
March, 1961.31
United States policy makers were well aware of the value Great Britain placed on
successfully leaving its colonies, and sought to avoid unnecessary conflict with the British.
Assistant Secretary of State William Burdett made clear in a position paper for the State
Department in 1962 that he understood that the British hoped to leave British Guiana in an
honorable fashion. However, he also realized that the British would not strain Anglo-American
relations to achieve their aims in the colony.32 Similarly, United States officials valued their
alliance with Great Britain above achieving the totality of their own strategic imperatives.
Initially, this goal seemed an undertaking best achieved by working with Cheddi Jagan and the
PPP, as evidenced by the Kennedy Administration policy of working with Jagan put forth in
September, 1961.33 United States reluctance and eventual outright refusal to accept this policy
impacted British planning. From 1953 to 1966 the United States and Great Britain gave
increasing consideration to the Cold War implications of decolonizing in the Caribbean.
Working within the framework of the Anglo-American relationship of the Cold War, the British
began exploring options in the colony which were more palatable to their partner. Jagan’s
continual pursuit of communist ties and the increasing instability in the colony which resulted
from his domestic policies, pushed the British further into the American camp. Eventually,
British concerns over the instability which would surround a Jagan-led government at
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independence coupled with American pressure, led the British to acquiesce and support the
Burnham coalition to lead the colony to independence.
Instability
The United States interpreted racial violence, and perhaps abetted it, within the context of
their Cold War strategic concerns, while the British considered how domestic unrest in British
Guiana would affect decolonization. The United States saw instability as a potential opening that
communist subversives could exploit to gain support, while the British were alarmed at the
possibility of post-colonial internal instability, and perhaps even civil war.34 The coming of
independence in the colony heightened existing racial tensions, and made the resolution of
instability crucial to the successful implementation of an autonomous government in the colony.
British officials were primarily concerned with the international consequences if violent
instability followed independence in the British Guiana. British prominence in the international
community hinged on the efficient and peaceful transition of its colonies to independence. The
British felt a strong need to maintain strong international support during the period of the Cold
War and decolonization.35 International support could be seriously compromised if Guianese
independence led directly to racial warfare. British Guiana’s instability had different implications
for the United States. The American fear that communist subversives would exploit domestic
instability in British Guiana was largely a consequence of the geographic importance of British
Guiana to the American Cold War strategy. American officials feared the regional repercussions
if British Guiana established a communist government after independence, specifically the
possibility of Venezuela, Brazil, and the Caribbean, especially Cuba, becoming destabilized.
34
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The consequences of inadequately confronting sectarian tensions in the Indian
subcontinent prior to independence contributed significantly to British perspectives on
decolonization. Great Britain condemned the region to a period of incredible violence followed
by persistent tensions between India and Pakistan by prematurely granting independence to the
region.36 British fear of instability in British Guiana was heavily influenced by the violent
conflicts which erupted in the Congo following its independence from Belgium as well.37 The
Guianese themselves were fearful of internal instability. Racial tensions had increased over the
decade preceding independence and were boiling over by 1962. The primarily urban AfroGuianese community and the rural East Indians who comprised the majority of the population
were increasingly in conflict. Guianese leaders, specifically Jagan and Burnham, exploited racial
dissension by engaging in race-based politics hoping to gain a political advantage. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) contributed to the strife in hopes of undermining the Jagan-led
government. Although the precise beginning of American involvement is uncertain, it clear that
by February 1962 at least some elements of the American government were actively working to
subvert the PPP.38 The result was an increasing racial polarization of Guianese society.39 Several
influential members of the Corentyne East Indian community met with Vice Consul Joseph
Johnson in March 1963 and voiced their concerns. The Guianese were hesitant to push for an end
to British rule due to conditions of racial animosity in the colony, as well as minimal educational
opportunities, and the lack of a diversified economy.40 Johnson felt that the only means of
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establishing stability was to implement the controversial system of Proportional Representation
prior to independence and eliminate Jagan as the head of the government. He determined that the
PNC would attempt to wrest control of the government from the PPP if Burnham lost a
traditional election, making proportional representation necessary to avoid civil war.41
In addition to strong fears of a communist takeover of the government, the Kennedy
Administration was apprehensive about the domestic consequences of instability in British
Guiana. There was a legitimate threat of civil war if the Guianese people were granted
independence under a PPP government. British Guiana’s segregated population, discussed at
length in chapter one, helped create this instability. Forbes Burnham used the Afro-Guianese
population which dominant the capital city of Georgetown to maintain control over organized
urban labor unions as well as the vast majority of the civil services. British colonial officials and
Jagan thought it critical to correct racial imbalances in the police force before independence.42
However, Jagan’s efforts to implement a predominantly East Indian security force were met with
opposition from the PNC as well as the United States.43 Burnham made clear that he was willing
to use force to gain power if Jagan attempted to develop an armed East Indian security force after
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independence.44 Additionally, British documents indicate independence under Burnham brought
the possibility of a similar conflict.45 Cheddi Jagan sought to strengthen the East Indian position
in the event of armed struggle by importing automatic weapons, almost certainly from Cuba, and
seeking military assistance from Israel.46 Thus, the Anglo-American decision to support
Burnham was a pragmatic way to avoid violent instability, since Burnham already controlled the
armed forces, in what was a geographically strategic region.
The somber consequences which faced the colony if the civil services remained racially
segregated became clearer as violence became endemic. By 1962, domestic violence in British
Guiana was no longer a threat, it was a reality. Labor unrest had devolved into racial violence,
spreading from the capital city of Georgetown to New Amsterdam and throughout the colony.
The racially polarized civil services proved inadequate for combating this violence. Frequently,
the uneven racial composition of the police force was the cause of much of the conflict. East
Indians directed most of their aggressions against the predominantly Afro-Guianese police force
and the police force was the source of considerable violence toward the East Indian
community.47 The PPP perpetuated the cycle of violence in the colony by supplying arms to the
East Indian community and organizing strikes.
In 1963 several East Indians were arrested with machine guns, weapons which were not
regularly available in British Guiana. British intelligence surmised that Jagan’s government was
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smuggling the weapons into the British Guiana from communist nations in the region.48 The
violence and instability in the colony in 1963 was quelled by the arrival of British troops, as it
had been the previous year. The PPP’s inability to maintain internal stability eroded British
confidence in the Jagan-led government.49 By 1964 bureaucratic strain resulted in the splintering
of the civil service structure, and racial tensions between the police force and the government
resulted in Janet Jagan’s resignation as Minister of Home Affairs.50 The instability of
governmental institutions was compounded by the fact that Burnham was openly considering the
possibility of armed revolt if the PPP remained in power after independence.51 Correcting the
racial imbalance in the Guianese civil services prior to granting the colony independence was of
paramount importance to the British and the significance of this issue increased as that time
approached and violence increased. Thus, while the Colonial Office hoped to grant independence
to British Guiana as quickly as possible, structural issues worked in concert with American
pressure to slow down the process of decolonization.
In addition, Great Britain’s fear of communist subversion in the colony was coupled with
apprehension at the possibility of the United States intervening to counter that threat. Prime
Minister Macmillan’s briefing prior to meeting President Kennedy noted that: “The British
Guiana government has been increasingly in contact with Cuba, Russia and other bloc countries
and there can now be little hope that on independence it would not follow the pattern of Cuba.
This would no doubt evoke a strong reaction in Latin America (as well as in the U.S.) with the

48

TNA, CO 1031/4407, Records of the West Indian Department, Memorandum of Conversation between Colonial
Governor Richard Luyt and Cheddi Jagan, 25 June 1964.
49
TNA, CO 1031/4493, Records of the West Indian Department, Colonial Office Information Department: British
Guiana Conference Failure of 1962 Deliberations: The Interest Taken by the United Nations, 22 October 1963.
50
Spinner, A Political and Social History of Guyana, 106.
51
Memorandum from Mr. Rubottom to Mr. Smith, 13 July 1960, RG 59, Records of the Department of State,
National Archives II, College Park, MD.

80

possibility of intervention.”52 British suspicions of United States intervention were well founded.
Formerly classified United States State Department records indicate that: “…if the PPP makes an
effort to take over the country by force, the U.S. government will not stand by and see opposition
crushed by terror.”53 Failed attempts at intervening in Cuba and the subsequent international
embarrassment tempered calls for intervention in the United States, but it did not eliminate them.
Geo-political Significance of British Guiana
British Guiana held a geo-strategic importance for the United States beginning with the
acquisition of Atkinson Airfield as a result of the Destroyer for Bases Deal with Great Britain in
1940.54 Atkinson Airfield was a significant aspect of United States hemispheric military
hegemony critical to American Cold War strategy. American officials felt that the United States
could not afford to lose the base in the event of a communist government coming to power in
British Guiana. In an internal memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
William Lang wrote: “…the Air Force is concerned with the need to retain available military
‘toe-holds’ on the South American continent for possible use in contingency operations in the
area,” and he continued: “…while there is no present need for the facilities in B.G….a future
requirement for their use may arise either in connection with developments in our missile and
space programs or with respect to contingency operations in Latin America.”55 Here again,
British Guiana is seen as a crucial aspect of the United States Cold War regional strategy.
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Even more important to the United States was British Guiana’s geographical proximity to
important Latin American nations, specifically Venezuela and Brazil. The United States AntiCommunist Campaign Task Force determined in 1958 that communist party membership in
Venezuela was 20,000 and the nation was the primary target for communist subversives in Latin
America.56 After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Venezuela harbored the largest and most active
communist party in the hemisphere outside of Cuba and Venezuelan communist party members
held a considerable number of leadership positions within the international communist
movement.57 In the early 1960s, Venezuela was the primary Latin American destination for
private capital flowing from the United States by a considerable margin.58 By 1962 the
Venezuelan Communist Party had embraced armed struggle as a vehicle for social change, and
eastern Venezuela, which had been the point of entry for previous subversive activity, became
strategically crucial once again.59 Thus, the Venezuela-British Guiana border was a point of
concern for the United States making British Guiana invaluable to the overarching geo-strategic
imperatives of the United States, especially in light of Cuba’s active exportation of revolution in
Latin America.60
Venezuela presented an additional problem for Great Britain. As noted earlier, the
Essequibo region, encompassing the border between British Guiana and Venezuela had been
contested since the mid-nineteenth century. The dispute was temporarily resolved with American
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mediation in 1895; however, Venezuela never fully accepted the decision and the dormant
dispute threatened to explode once the colony was granted independence.61 The British
government could not withdraw from the colony in a dignified manner if that withdrawal meant
an immediate conflict with its neighbors. The small Guianese security force would be
insufficient to protect the new nation’s sovereignty if Venezuela pressed its claim to Guianese
territory.62 Ultimately, the resolution of the Venezuelan claim prior to independence was
achieved through a complex diplomatic dynamic involving contentious behind the scenes deals
between the United States and Great Britain. The Johnson Administration used its close
relationship with Venezuela as leverage to convince the British to station troops in British
Guiana after independence. American officials agreed to convince the Venezuelans to forego
their claim in return for a temporary British military presence in British Guiana. British officials,
however, were offended by what they perceived as blackmail by the United States.63 Despite
British anger over the American suggestion, they agreed to the arbitration and a relatively
cooperative dynamic continued between Great Britain and the United States in coordinating
policy toward British Guiana.
Considerably more threatening to Anglo-American geo-political strategy was news that
claimed Cuban arms were flowing through British Guiana into Venezuela and Brazil. Brazil, the
largest nation in Latin America, was long thought to be on the verge of asserting itself as a global
power. Brazil’s stability was essential for the United States hemispheric strategy during the Cold
War. As with Venezuela, Brazil’s shared border with British Guiana was a region of instability
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and subversive activity. According to a Washington Daily News report on August 7, 1963, arms
and ammunition were being smuggled from Cuba through British Guiana into Venezuela and
Brazil. The sources said that the supplies were delivered by planes using dirt landing strips near
the Venezuelan and Brazilian borders.64 While there is no evidence that the Soviet Union was
directly assisting the PPP, Soviet assistance could have reached the colony with Cuba acting as
intermediary. Relations between Jagan and the Castro government were limited; however, it is
significant that Jagan openly pursued closer ties with the Cuban government and welcomed
Cuban assistance whenever it was available. The United States could not easily dismiss these
overtures as insignificant when developing policy during the Cold War. Thus, the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations concluded that the threat posed by a Jagan-led PPP government aligning
with Cuba, and by default with the Soviet Union, was legitimate. Consequently, American
officials applied diplomatic pressure, engaged in economic sanctions and covert action, and
staved off the British attempt at granting independence, until a more suitable government could
be established in Georgetown.
Although it is generally advisable for historians to avoid engaging in counterfactual
arguments; it is worth pausing for a moment to consider what might have happened. When
evaluating the American fear of communist subversion in British Guiana, it is critical to
contextualize the Cold War imperatives involved in the decision making process in the United
States, and to a lesser extent Great Britain. In 1967 Che Guevara led a small band of rebels
through Bolivia in an attempt to foment Cuban-style revolution in the country as the precursor to
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a continental-wide communist revolution. Historians have generally agreed that Bolivia was a
poor choice for Guevara to begin.65
What if British Guiana had been granted independence under a Jagan led PPP
government friendly to Cuba? Geographically, politically, and ideologically, an independent
Guyana would have provided a much more advantageous starting point for advancing the Cuban
revolutionary strategy across the continent than Bolivia. Politically, a Jagan led government may
have been supportive or willing to turn a blind eye to Cuban activities. Cuban arms likely were
already smuggled through British Guiana, even while the British maintained a colonial presence.
In the absence of British oversight, under considerable stress to counter the PNC and attempts by
the United States at subversion, and with an explosive border dispute to the west; Jagan would
likely have increased his ties to the Castro regime in Cuba to maintain control of the country.
The Cubans would have had a supportive government, albeit with a nominally stable populace,
on mainland South America through which they would have had access and jungle cover to
infiltrate Venezuela and Brazil. The proximity of communists in Venezuela and northeastern
Brazil would have offered a springboard for expanding the revolution. The acquisition of
Atkinson Airfield would have been a boon for the communist movement as well as an immense
ideological loss for the United States. Additionally, instability in the far more economically
relevant nations of Venezuela and Brazil would have been an ideological victory of far more
consequence than a few unsupported rebels traversing the mountains of tiny Bolivia. While this
scenario involves a considerable amount of speculation, it also accentuates the intricate frailty
and uncertainty of South America in the 1960s. This is precisely why the United States was
compelled to confront every perceived threat in the region as crucial to the nation’s interest. It is
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exactly the possibility of such a scenario that led the United States to fear what was at the time a
possibility.66
Economic Considerations
Great Britain was aware of Jagan’s communist ideals and his attempts to court Cuba, as
well as Eastern bloc nations; however, the British were more concerned with British Guiana’s
economic viability than of communist subversion. The British exerted considerable effort to
ensure that capitalist investment would continue to flow into British Guiana after independence.
Booker Brothers, the primary investor in the colony, was confident that Jagan was best suited to
lead an independent government in British Guiana.67 The American based Reynolds Metals
Company, one of the largest aluminum companies in the world, had considerable investments in
Guianese bauxite, which it supplied to the United States, which needed the raw materials to
sustain the Cold War military buildup. Walter Rice, Vice President of Reynolds Metals, became
concerned in June 1962 when he learned that Jagan had been in contact with Poland and other
Eastern Bloc countries attempting to broker trade agreements for Guianese bauxite. Jagan’s
alleged dealings were predicated on the nationalization of some or all of Reynolds Metal’s
holdings in British Guiana.68 British concerns over the prospect of Jagan nationalizing private
capital were tempered, despite Jagan’s intentions, because of the significant cultural value East
Indian farmers placed on the rights of private property. The British concluded that Jagan could
never pursue government ownership of private property without losing his base of political
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support.69 Ultimately, American preoccupation with the PPP’s foreign policy and British
Guiana’s significance as a crucial part of the regional Cold War strategy, trumped British
analysis of domestic programs and resulted in a persistent fear of Jagan’s communist leanings.
American pressure combined with Jagan’s ineffective leadership culminating in Anglo-American
support for Burnham.
Contention and Cooperation in the Anglo-American Alliance
The United States and Great Britain envisioned a stable, pro-Western government being
established in British Guiana after independence; however, there was not a consensus on how to
achieve these aims. Thus, the United States and Great Britain exerted a considerable effort to
formulate a coordinated policy in British Guiana before independence was given to the Guianese.
The level of cooperation in developing a coordinated British Guiana policy between Great
Britain and the United States cannot be understated. It is perhaps best exemplified in an internal
memorandum regarding the post-independence stationing of British troops in Guyana, which
stated: “In reaching this difficult decision, we took fully into account United States views as
expressed by Mr. Bundy (your telegram under reference) and again by Mr. Rusk in his talks with
the Colonial Secretary.”70 The same was true of policymakers in the United States. American
policy considered British imperatives at every turn.71
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Initially, the United States deferred to British strategy in British Guiana and in mid-1961
President John F. Kennedy outlined a strategy for working with Cheddi Jagan. The decision was
founded on the idea that the British should take the lead in formulating policy in their colony,
despite its geographic proximity to the United States. The State Department indicated that the
United States government was pursuing a: “whole hearted, across the board effort to work with
Cheddi Jagan.”72 The American policy was the result of a careful consideration of British
concerns and the desire to have a coordinated policy with British officials. The necessity of
maintaining a strong Anglo-American alliance compelled the United States to attempt to work
with Jagan, despite strong misgivings about his intentions once independence was granted.
Jagan’s foreign policy decisions undermined this policy by June 1962, but the significance of
working within a cooperative framework remained.
The brief for Prime Minister Harold MacMillan’s visit with President John F. Kennedy at
Birch Grove in June 1963 exemplifies the importance of United States imperatives to British
policy. Likewise, it shows how Great Britain played an active part in the formation of United
States policy in an effort to create a functional alliance. MacMillan’s talking points acknowledge
the fact that the British had no strategic interest in British Guiana and their overriding goal was
to withdraw from the colony as soon as possible. The British withheld independence despite their
general approval of Jagan and were willing to work with the United States to establish an
alternative government under Burnham to quell American anxieties.73 MacMillan sought to
appease both British and American interests in British Guiana. The overall significance of British
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Guiana to relations between the nations was acknowledged in the Joint Assessment by U.S. and
British Officials that was agreed upon during Kennedy and Macmillan’s talks. The assessment
made clear that Anglo-American relations would suffer considerably if a communist government
emerged in British Guiana after independence.74Therefore, Great Britain framed its
decolonization policies within the broader context of United States Cold War strategy.
Simultaneously the United States, while pushing its geo-strategic objectives in British Guiana,
accepted that British imperatives in the colony would inevitably impact the direction of policies
made in Washington.
The appropriate level of intervention within the British Guianese domestic scene was an
area of frustration and, occasionally, contention between British and American policymakers.
John Henning, Colonial Office attaché at the British embassy in Washington, joked: “…it is
difficult for [American policymakers] to realise how impotent the colonial power is. This
reluctance is traditional: it is somewhat of a national heresy for Americans to believe that the
colonial power against which their patriots rose and battled so heroically was really rather
powerless.” He continued: “…you would think that a nation that resented imperial legislation as
vigorously as they did would be among the first to recognise the consequences of legislating by
Order in Counsel over the headx {sic} of Dr. Jagan…Knox admits this, but suspects that there is
something wrong in a world in which what was good for Sam Adams must be good for Cheddi
Jagan!”75 This tongue in cheek statement hints at the challenge for the two nations. The relative
power of Great Britain in controlling the events within their colony was considerably less than
what the United States imagined. The United States expected British support of American Cold
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War policies and Great Britain backed the United States as much as was possible; however,
decolonization presented a challenge to the special relationship.
The geographical significance of British Guiana for the United States tempted them to
pursue policies which were more aggressive than what Great Britain was willing to engage in.
The British, adjusting to the new international environment of the post-World War II era, were
reluctant to intervene too aggressively in the decolonization process in their own colony.
Additionally, the British were restrained by the practical realities of decolonizing an empire.
Colonial officials needed to understand and consider the local conditions which varied in each
colony and ensure that the incoming government was prepared to maintain stability when the
British withdrawal from the colony was final. Finally, the entire decolonization process was
complicated by Great Britain’s need to incur minimal financial drain as they liquidated the
empire. For both ideological and practical reasons, the United States and Great Britain were
never entirely in agreement about how to best decolonize British Guiana and were each forced to
make concessions to assure the success of their partnership.
The United States offered financial aid, diplomatic pressure, and vocal support for British
policies in the international community as a means of generating compromise with British
officials. Deputy Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Gordon
Knox, explained to Assistant Secretary of State, William Burdett that: “If the U.S. could promise
substantial aid, e.g., not less than $15,000,000 per year HMG would be inclined to accede to our
wishes…and if the British felt that Burnham would get arms from the USG or from agencies of
the US government…it might prefer to postpone its departure temporarily. If the British felt that
their wishes would be heeded by the U.S. with regard to certain other problems in other parts of
the world…in return for British compliance to U.S. wishes in BG, the British Government might
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strive more energetically to bring about in BG a pre-independence PR election.”76 Thus, the
delay of independence for British Guiana and the British institution of proportional
representation in the colony before the December 1964 election can be seen largely as a
successful negotiation between the United States and Great Britain and between the imperatives
of Cold War and decolonization.
British and American imperatives coalesced as it became clear that a Cheddi Jagan led
PPP could not establish domestic stability in British Guiana. It is critical to acknowledge that
Jagan’s inability to control the civil services, and thus maintain order in the colony, weighed on
the British decision to support Burnham. It is not coincidental that the determination by the
British that Burnham could maintain the loyalty of the police force preceded their decision to
compromise with the United States.77 It is also critical to acknowledge that British and American
officials had come to a near agreement about what the PPP’s foreign policy designs would be for
the post-colonial government. Both Great Britain and the United States were certain that Jagan
would move to establish a Castro-styled communist government after independence. They
disagreed only in that the United States felt that intervention was necessary to keep Jagan from
succeeding, while British officials thought that internal opposition in British Guiana may be
strong enough to impede the PPP’s plans.78 Thus, Burnham’s adroit diplomacy, which addressed
specific American concerns about British Guiana’s post-colonial foreign policy, gave the AngloAmerican alliance a way to keep the colony from establishing a communist government.
Burnham explained to American Consul, Delmar Carlson, that once the PNC assumed power, he
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would not recognize the Soviet Union or Castro, he would cut trade with Cuba, and British
Guiana would apply to join the Organization of American States (OAS).79 Supporting Burnham
would provide the internal stability necessary to fulfill the British objective of stabilizing the
Guianese government prior to independence and concurrently absolve the United States of the
worry of a communist government springing up in a geographically crucial region of the world.
The Anglo-American strategy was not without its potential problems; however, fear of
post-colonial political oppression in British Guiana was less of a concern to British and
American policymakers than addressing strategic concerns. British officials were aware that the
PNC would seek to suppress the PPP and its supporters once they colony had achieved
independence. Colonial Governor Richard Luyt was equally disturbed at the notion that the PNC
would not address racial imbalances in the civil services and thus further oppress East Indians in
British Guiana.80 However, post-colonial pitfalls were judged to be less of a risk than supporting
the Jagan-led government. Luyt concluded that the PPP had proven itself incapable of governing
British Guiana. The Jagans could not hope to assert their authority over a predominantly AfroGuianese police force. Additionally, the PPP foreign policy assured that British Guiana would
not receive American development aid after independence if the Jagans were in power. Finally,
instability would be assured in the colony and the PNC and UF in opposition would be capable
of undermining the government because of their supporters in Georgetown.81 Thus, British
decolonization imperatives began to align with American goals in British Guiana and an AngloAmerican compromise became possible for the colony.
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The United States applied persistent pressure on Great Britain to support Burnham and
once obtained, that support proved decisive. Burnham was the leader British and American
officials were forced to work with, and certainly not the leader with whom they desired to work.
State Department records indicate that the United States made an ongoing effort to find a viable
anti-communist alternative to Jagan to lead the East Indians.82 Great Britain and the United
States made pragmatic choices in British Guiana based on a strategically poor set of possibilities.
Burnham and Jagan, as will be explored in the following chapter, played a crucial role in
determining British Guiana’s destiny. However, local conditions in British Guiana worked
against the establishment of a PPP government in British Guiana.
Ultimately, Great Britain and the United States coordinated their policy based on mutual
interests in British Guiana. Each pursued individual interests, while being cognizant of the
imperatives of its ally. The United States was primarily concerned with waging the Cold War, a
struggle occurring most often and intensely in previous European colonies. Great Britain, in turn,
was engaged heavily in disassembling its erstwhile empire, an exercise never divorced from its
Cold War implications. Despite what was at times a contentious relationship, the two nations
forged a decolonization policy which, at the time, achieved both nations’ goals in the region. The
British established an independent government in British Guiana that maintained stability after
British troops and administrators left, and the United States set in place a leader willing to work
within an American approved Cold War framework. The consequences for the Guianese people
were less positive. Burnham implemented an increasingly repressive government, supported by
fraudulent elections and American aid.83 Thus, the United States and Great Britain won a
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complex Cold War victory in British Guiana. Having established British and American
objectives in British Guiana, the following chapter will elaborate on the role of the Guianese
themselves in determining the actions taken by the Western Powers.
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Chapter 4: Participants in the Cold War: The Impact of the People’s Progressive Party’s
Foreign Policy in British Guiana
Since 1898 the United States has held a dominant position in the Caribbean and has
helped define Western inter- hemispheric relations. Throughout the twentieth century, American
strategic and economic imperatives in the region were advanced through frequent and diverse
forms of intervention. Through the Good Neighbor Policy, Presidents Herbert Hoover and
Franklin Roosevelt attempted to minimize the role of direct intervention during the 1930s and
1940s. However, heightened international tensions during the Cold War provided the impetus for
a return to interventionism in the Caribbean with the aim of preserving American ideals and
security. The previous chapter discussed the strategic objectives of the United States and Great
Britain in British Guiana. This chapter will narrow the focus and examine how Guianese leaders
made foreign policy decisions which impacted American and British policy toward British
Guiana. Specifically, the chapter will show how the People’s Progressive Party (PPP)
squandered an opportunity to work with the United States between August 1961 and June 1962,
effectively ending its chances of being the party that would lead British Guiana to independence.
Additionally, this chapter will briefly discuss how and why the United States and Great Britain
determined in June 1963 to eliminate the PPP as the party of the government in British Guiana
before the transfer of power.
Policymakers in the United States perceived the growing power of the Soviet Union after
World War II as a serious threat to the region that required an increased assertion of American
influence to thwart international communist subversion. The United States government had
determined to tighten security in its backyard. However, despite the relatively diminutive size of
Caribbean nations, and the strength of the United States, it is critical not to underestimate the
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impact of less powerful hemispheric leaders on policy in the United States. Some adroit
hemispheric officials successfully pursued independent policies in the shadow of their neighbor
to the north, while the others wrought their own demise by failing to engage the United States
with effective diplomacy. This chapter will explore the failure of the Cheddi and Janet Jagan led
PPP government in British Guiana from 1961-1963. It will explain the PPP’s failure as a result
of Jagan’s inability to conduct an efficient foreign policy, specifically in relation to the United
States.
The Influence of the Cold War on Interpreting Decolonization in British Guiana
The historiography of British Guiana speaks to the issue of racial politics and the
important role played by Great Britain and the United States in determining the course of
Guianese independence. While several authors have made a connection between internal politics
and foreign intervention, the crucial role played by the colony’s political leadership in
influencing Anglo-American foreign policy has been largely overlooked. Domestic politics in
British Guiana increasingly degenerated into racially polarized blocs after the PPP split in 1955.1
The division of the party into two distinct political-racial constituencies, East Indian and AfroGuianese, is well documented. Both Jagan’s PPP and Forbes Burnham’s People’s National
Congress (PNC) struggled to maintain their ethnically diverse memberships, which had led to
domestic success of the PPP in the early 1950s. Despite their efforts, Guianese politics diverged
along racial lines and both men sought to enhance the façade of a multi-racial appeal of their
parties even as their political campaigns and policies became more singularly focused on
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appealing to their respective racial communities.2 Jagan and Burnham realized that regardless of
which party controlled the government at independence, social conflict was a distinct possibility.
They also understood that Great Britain was unlikely to grant independence to the colony until
the Guianese established a government capable of suppressing racial violence and sustaining
domestic stability. Nevertheless, the colony remained politically divided into two racial
constituencies, a trend Jagan and Burnham perpetuated. Jagan enjoyed a slight edge in popular
support within the colony; however, whoever could successfully court the third constituency,
interested foreign powers, would determine the fate of the colony. Jagan’s failure to effectively
engage in pragmatic diplomacy coupled with Burnham’s ability to placate to the interests of the
United States resulted in greater Anglo-American support for the PNC, and thus won Burnham
the leading role in a newly independent Guyana.
Scholars have traditionally explained the Jagans’ struggle in British Guiana as a David
fighting against the Goliaths of the United States and Great Britain. They attribute the PPP loss
of power to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert subversion, primarily through
financing Guianese opposition under the cloak of international labor organizations such as the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), and InterAmerican Regional Organization (ORIT). Jagan is often portrayed as a victim of the Cold War, a
phrase that he himself used to describe the plight of his nation.3 Academics such as Stephen
Rabe and Thomas Spinner have suggested that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations took
advantage of endemic, but previously contained, racial tensions in Guianese society to
2
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manipulate the domestic politics of the colony using the politics of racial discord.4 Thus, the
Jagans would be defeated through isolation from the Afro-Guianese community and a loss of
their multi-ethnic coalition. According to these interpretations, the United States government
used the ensuing social unrest to pressure Great Britain into manipulating the electoral system of
British Guiana as a way of achieving the desired outcome, a government fronted by Forbes
Burnham. There is ample evidence to suggest that the United States maintained a consistent
strategy of opposition to Cheddi and Janet Jagan in British Guiana between 1953 and 1966 and
the British Colonial Office’s imposition of proportional representation on the colony was a
transparent attempt to remove the Jagans through ostensibly legal means.5
Similarly, Richard Barnet sees developments in British Guiana as being the consequence
of overzealous American anti-communism. Barnet is prescient in noting the complexity of
relations between the United States and Great Britain in the Cold War world. He notes that the
United States saw the decline of the British Empire as an economic opportunity; however, after
World War II, American policymakers also viewed the drastically changing global power
structure as a threat to their national security. The power vacuum in post-colonial regions, along
with the increasing role of the Soviet Union and localized communist movements in developing
areas, was specifically troubling to American officials.6 According to Barnet, the United States
sought to improve their security by eliminating governments in the developing world which they
deemed communist. He suggests a number of qualities that American policymakers looked for in
making such a classification, such as nationalization of private industry, radical land reform,
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autocratic trade policies, acceptance of Soviet or Chinese aid, and insistence on following an
anti-American or non-aligned foreign policy. According to Barnet, the existence of these
qualities in the third world was used to justify American intervention.7 Barnet effectively notes
the dangers faced by American policymakers, who were overly rigid in their classification of
emerging governments, when perceiving the world through a Cold War lens. Barnet concludes
that the United States, when it feared a communist regime emerging in the developing world,
would undermine or even pursue its expulsion. The PPP in British Guiana exhibited most, if not
all, of Barnet’s qualifications; however, explanations which attribute the demise of the Jagans in
the 1960s solely to American intervention are incomplete. This chapter suggests that the PPP’s
foreign policy, in conjunction with American subversive activities, undermined the Jagans’
position in British Guiana.
The Jagans were career politicians, who although adept at building inter-Guianese
political coalitions, failed at foreign policy. Despite the corrosive dynamic of American
opposition and Jaganite irritation, the PPP maintained a position of dominance in British Guiana
into the 1960s. The PPP’s victory in the August 1961 elections ushered in the decisive period of
pre-independence politics in British Guiana. In this critical moment, Cheddi Jagan and the
Party’s leadership squandered the opportunity to become a viable option to lead the colony to
independence. The inability of the PPP to appreciate the degree to which the United States set
the Cold War agenda for intra-hemispheric relations contributed to the party’s failure. More
importantly, Jagan’s failure to accurately assess the consequences of concurrent events in the
Caribbean, especially in Cuba, led to a failed foreign policy. Thus, despite the Jagans knack for
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obtaining electoral victories in British Guiana, Cheddi Jagan could not retain enough support in
Great Britain to overcome the effects of American opposition.
A Comparison of Latin American Nationalist Leaders During the Early Cold War
It is enlightening to compare Jagan to other regional leaders who did develop effective
relationships with the United States, and to examine the dissimilar trajectories their political
careers followed as a result of that association. Kyle Longley and Eric Roorda have explored
how Jose Figueres in Costa Rica and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic were able to
pursue nationalist policies and resist United States domination in a heightened period of
American intervention. Figueres even managed to work with leftists and communists in Costa
Rica to achieve his domestic goals.8 Their work lays the groundwork for political studies of local
Caribbean leaders during the mid-twentieth century. Figueres and Trujillo thrived primarily as a
result of their ability to conduct successful foreign relations with the United States due to several
key advantages which they utilized effectively. Four key distinctions can be made between the
Jagans and Figueres and Trujillo.
First, Figueres and Trujillo were able to take advantage of a positive historical
relationship with the United States. Longley describes Figueres as having benefited from a
legacy of amicable exchange wherein Costa Rica had established itself as a supporter of the
United States during major international crisis; including declaring war on Japan in 1941before
the United States congress officially approved hostilities.9 Similarly, Trujillo survived
considerable international opposition as well as resistance from the State Department to a great
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degree because of relationships developed during his time working with the United States
Marines.10 Jagan, and indeed British Guiana itself, did not inherit the benefits of previously
successful political ties to the United States. The United State generally ignored British Guiana
until international labor unions alleged the existence of communist elements in the colony in the
mid-1950s. Thus, Guianese political leaders had no political capital to draw on for support from
the United States, while they attempted to progress toward independence at odds with several
key American ideological positions.
Secondly, Figueres and Trujillo benefited from the support of their respective militaries.
Trujillo initially came to power as head of the Dominican military and he maintained that role
until his demise in 1961. Despite opposition from Rafael Calderon and small armed
insurrections, Figueres was never in danger of losing control of the armed forces and came to
power in part as the consequence of armed revolt.11 Jagan, however, never controlled the armed
services in British Guiana and as a result was incapable of asserting control over the colony
when crisis occurred. Janet Jagan’s resignation as head of the civil services in 1964 is
characteristic of the PPP’s relationship with the mostly Afro-Guianese police force, which took
its orders from the political opposition, namely, Forbes Burnham.12 Officials in the United States
placed a considerable importance on the maintenance of stability in the Caribbean, especially
during the Cold War, and the PPP was powerless to assert control without the aid of British
troops.13
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Thirdly, and most importantly, the United States demanded a firm commitment to anticommunism in the Caribbean during the Cold War. Figueres and Trujillo were adamant anticommunists, while Jagan held an ideological position opposite to that of the United States,
supporting communist nations and praising the Cuban Revolution. Trujillo avoided repercussions
for countless repressive measures and violence because he advanced the geo-strategic
imperatives of the United States, assuring stability in his small nation.14 Figures initially obtained
support from the United States after Calderon failed to discern the shift in American policy
toward opposing left-wing politicians after the Second World War.15 American officials were
confused about Figueres’ ideology. Indeed, he was classified at times as authoritarian and
socialist, but he remained clearly anti-communist.16 His vocal commitment to combat
communism provided him with the leeway to enact domestic social reforms which destroyed
other Caribbean leaders, specifically Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Figueres nationalized banks
and imposed taxes on the wealthy, though even in pursuing domestic reform Figures was aware
of the need to work within a framework acceptable to the United States. Confrontation with the
influential United Fruit Company was the impetus for the American supported overthrow of
Arbenz, and Figueres wisely avoided challenging United Fruit in Costa Rica.17 Jagan’s domestic
program was moderately reformative; however, when coupled with his vocal support of
communism, it was unacceptable to the United States. The determining factor in American
opposition to the PPP was the Jagans’ vocal support of communism and their pursuit of a foreign
policy which seemed to support their communist ideology.

14

Roorda, The Dictator Next Door, 192-193, 228-231.
Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk, 40.
16
Ibid, 59.
17
Ibid, 87-88.
15

102

Finally, Figueres and Trujillo maintained the support of key elements within the United
States. Figueres was close to liberal democratic groups and labor leaders, such as Robert
Alexander and Serafino Romualdi. Trujillo had ties to the United States military and individuals
close to the White House such as Joseph E. Davis, who was a close friend of President Roosevelt
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.18 Both men were willing to placate the American public.
Trujillo named highways after George Washington and the United States Marine Corps and
Figueres made frequent references to symbolically connect Costa Rica and the United States.19
Tellingly, Romualdi, who was president of the AFL and CIO backed Inter-American Regional
Organization (ORIT), was closely connected to the Kennedy White House, and was one of
Jagan’s staunchest opponents. Figueres condemned radical anti-American policies during a
speech in Havana, while Jagan continually supported the Cuban Revolution, at one point
referring to Castro as the greatest liberator of the twentieth century and calling on his people to
help defend the Cubans, with arms if necessary.20 The disparity between Figueres, Trujillo and
Jagan can best be summarized in their own words. Jose Figueres angered the United States when
he publically stated: “I know. I am a citizen of a ‘banana republic’.”21 Notwithstanding the
irritation of American officials, the statement provides a key insight into Figueres’ ability to
thrive as a political figure during the Cold War. He understood his political reality, made
concessions when necessary and thus freed himself to pursue an independent course of action
elsewhere. Conversely, Jagan was quoted in December 1961 as stating: “We don’t want to get
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involved in the Cold War. We have been victims of it.”22 On the surface his statement may
appear benign; however, it belies Jagan’s critical flaw as a politician. He was incapable of
comprehending the reality of his tenuous position as the proposed leader of a soon to be
independent Caribbean nation. Cheddi Jagan attempted to operate in an ideological world in
which he did not have to confront real world political situations. Whereas Figueres and Trujillo
acknowledged and manipulated their key political reality, namely, that the United States was the
ultimate authority in the Western Hemisphere, Jagan either did not appreciate it until it was too
late, or he ignored it. Regardless, his inability to establish an effectively functioning foreign
policy based on a realistic assessment of his political footing doomed him to be the victim that he
claimed to be.
Contextualizing the Impact of American Subversion in Undermining the PPP Government
This chapter suggests that the PPP’s foreign policy was the determining factor in framing
American strategy in British Guiana; however, it would be remiss to overlook the effect of
momentum on bureaucratic politics, in this instance the role of the AFL-CIO and the CIA.
Stephen Rabe notes that American labor leaders, such as Alexander, Romualdi, and Jay
Lovestone, were actively involved in Guianese politics throughout the 1950s, likely operating
with covert funding from the CIA. The CIA began actively pursuing a strategy of spreading
racial domestic unrest to diminish support for the PPP, which impacted events as early as the end
of the 1950s and certainly by the early 1960s. Additionally, Rabe is prescient in noting that
Alexander, Romualdi, and Lovestone had close access to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
which presented them an opportunity to influence policymaking in Washington and advance an
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anti-PPP agenda.23 However, the Jagans’ decision to persistently seek cultural, economic,
military, and especially ideological, associations with communist nations reinforced American
opposition and compounded the erosion of the PPP’s position in the colony as a consequence of
the CIA’s manufactured internal racial discord. The foreign policy of the PPP undermined Jagan
and perpetually antagonized consecutive administrations in the United States. Thus, it was the
PPP foreign policy, not bureaucratic inertia, which led to the decision of the United States
government to subvert Jagan .
PPP Policy From 1953 to 1959
British Guiana was first granted internal self-government in April 1953 after a national
election in which the PPP won a landslide victory. The Jagans overestimated the strength of their
position, however, and pursued a course which failed disastrously and would be indicative of
their missteps over the ensuing decade. The Jagans chose to combine an agenda of social reform
with a vocal espousal of Marxist rhetoric. In less than six months Great Britain suspended the
constitution in British Guiana and reverted to direct control, fearing a communist takeover of the
colony.24 The Jagans stubbornly refused to adapt to political realities, perhaps because they
maintained the dominant position in Guianese politics. Other important members of the PPP did
adapt to strategic realities and split with the party over the course of the ensuing decade. The
most important rift in Guianese politics occurred when key members of the PPP split from the
party in 1955, most of whom followed a faction led by Forbes Burnham.
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The Jagans spent nearly a decade organizing and ascending within the Guianese political
structure before the election in 1953. They interpreted their astounding victory as a confirmation
that they were indeed representative of the Guianese people and increasingly infused their
personal political beliefs into the governing of the colony, identifying the nationalist cause of the
Guianese with the anti-colonial aspirations of other colonized areas of the world. More
importantly, the Jagans proceeded with social reforms and sought to develop ties with left-wing
governments. Decisions made in the immediate aftermath of the election came to the attention of
international trade unions with ties to the United States government. Serafino Romualdi, InterAmerican Representative of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) derided the Jagans for
importing what he called subversive literature over a number of years. In an article for the AFL’s
Free Trade Union News, Romualdi noted: “When Jagan came to power his first act was to repeal
the [Anti-Subversive Literature] Bill.” The bill was the first of a number of controversial reforms
passed by the PPP over the summer of 1953. Romualdi also thought it important to note that:
“…two weeks after the elections which the PPP won, Mrs. Jagan went to Russia according to the
newspapers.”25 British Colonial governor Alfred Savage had already suspended British Guiana’s
constitution and reasserted direct control over the colony by the time Romualdi’s concerns were
heard in the United States.26 However, the Jagans maneuvers laid the basis for American
suspicion of the PPP’s intentions for British Guiana. The PPP would have to adapt politically to
win the increasingly important third constituency in colonial politics.
Both Cheddi and Janet Jagan endured prison sentences in British Guiana in1954 for acts
of civil disobedience. Cheddi Jagan violated a travel ban confining PPP members to Georgetown
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when he visited a branch of his dental surgery practice on the East Coast of Demerara on April 3
and was imprisoned until September 11. Janet was arrest a few days before her husband was
released, for allegedly being in possession of a ‘Secret’ Police Riot Manual and organizing a
political meeting. There is considerable debate over the severity of the Jagan’s offenses. Cheddi
Jagan in fact claimed that the riot manual was planted in his home and that the supposed political
meeting his wife organized was nothing more than an Indian religious festival, known as a
Bhagwat.27 Regardless of the minimal nature of their offenses, the Jagans continued to receive
negative publicity, while their erstwhile ally, Burnham, organized a new strategy for obtaining
power in British Guiana.
The suspension of the British Guianese government in 1953 because of British fear of a
communist revolution and the ensuing repression against the party destabilized the PPP and by
1955 the party split into two factions, one led by Forbes Burnham, the other by the Jagans. The
division of the PPP can be attributed primarily to two causes, an internal power struggle between
the Jagans and Burnham for supremacy within the party and an ideological conflict over the
future direction of the PPP. Burnham’s faction defined themselves as moderate social democrats
while the Jagans continued to espouse Marxists political ideals, though somewhat less fervently
than prior to the British intervention in 1953.28 While somewhat tempered, the Jagans continued
to espouse radical rhetoric in the aftermath of the split in the PPP. The political ideals of the
Jaganite faction were elaborated on in a policy statement obtained by The Daily Chronicle. In
December 1956 the United States Consul, A. John Cope, wrote to the State Department
regarding this information. He interpreted the statement to be a confirmation of Jagan as “an
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unrepentant Communist” who “remains steadfast in support of Soviet Communist policy.”29
When national elections were held in 1957, the Jaganite faction of the PPP resoundingly defeated
the Burnham faction and re-affirmed its position as the primary political force in the colony.
Burnham finalized his split with the party after the election by forming the PNC. The PPP
exercised prudence in the first two years after the election and created the opportunity for the
Jagans to work with the United States and potentially win the third constituency. Thus, despite
the Jagans’ radical rhetoric, they briefly showed signs of wanting to work with the United States,
before the Cuban Revolution altered their perception of British Guiana’s political realities.
The PPP made several requests for loans from the United States from 1957-1959, and
though the United States was generally unreceptive to Jagan’s overtures for financial assistance,
relations began to improve, establishing a possible basis for future cooperation.30 State
Department officials went as far as recommending the government work with Cheddi Jagan in
July 1959, citing “responsible” behavior after the election in 1957.However, American officials
remained skeptical of Jagan’s intentions and encouraged moderate cooperation, “without a great
show of friendliness.”31 Internal records indicate that Jagan impressed the officials with whom he
met during his visit in July 1959. A summary of the meeting characterized him as: “personable,
utterly charming, intellectually very bright, highly articulate, well informed and a most able
narrator of his country’s problems.” Most importantly he was: “not see[n] to fit the description of
Communist which has been applied to him.”32 It is unlikely that upper level administrators in the
State Department shared these conclusions, considering Jagan did not meet with anyone above
29
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the Office Director Level; nonetheless, the fact remains that for a fleeting moment in 1959,
Cheddi Jagan began to make inroads toward reconciliation with the United States.33 However,
attempts to appease the United States were half-hearted at best and even as Cheddi Jagan was
charming to his hosts in Washington, he and Janet were undermining their cause with political
activities elsewhere.
The Increasingly Aggressive PPP Policy After the Cuban Revolution
The Jagans continued to foster ties with Eastern bloc countries, which aroused the
suspicion of concerned American officials between 1959 and 1960. Economic associations with
Hungary and East Germany in 1959 were interpreted by Hugh Cumming as an effort to obscure
aid coming from Communist nations and in April 1960 Jagan spoke openly of a potential trade
agreement with Cuba. The fact that Jagan had just visited the revolutionary nation was not lost
on Cumming.34 Cheddi Jagan returned to British Guiana in May 1960 after stopping in Trinidad
to give a speech in which he spoke openly and strongly of supporting the Cuban Revolution and
making the Cuban cause the cause of the rest of the Caribbean. He went so far as to suggest that
the Guianese should take up arms to defend the Cubans against an attempted invasion by
“imperialists”.35 United States Consul Everett Melby wrote to the Department of State in July
summarizing the “communist situation in British Guiana”. The new American Consul had
numerous and varied concerns including PPP rhetoric printed in the party’s periodical Thunder;
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the importation of communist literature; communist contacts; Soviet Bloc trade, aid, and
scholarships; and ties with Cuba.36
It is important to recognize that the PPP’s foreign policy became notably more aggressive
in 1959. Apparent policy changes, including attempts at moderating domestic reform and
reconciling with the United States, were reversed two years after the Colonial Office
reintroduced internal self-government to British Guiana. It is possible that American indifference
toward Jagan’s requests for aid influenced the Guianese leader to seek assistance elsewhere;
however, further explanation is required to illustrate why Jagan turned to the communist world at
that specific time. The success of the Cuban Revolution in early 1959 and its strong opposition to
the United States appears to have been the catalyst for a reinvigoration of Jagan’s belief in
Marxism. Jagan immediately moved to create economic ties with Cuba and voiced strong
support for Fidel Castro in the ensuing five years. His positive response to events in Cuba,
especially after Castro defined the Revolution as socialist, is consistent with his purported
Marxist ideology. In an April 1960 speech in Trinidad, Jagan declared that Castro was “beloved
by everyone” and suggested that British Guiana should come to the aid of Cuba if the United
States intervened on the island. He continued to interpret the Cuban experience as proof that
British Guiana could also effectively pursue independence without collaborating with the United
States and sought solidarity with the Cubans. 37 Thus, Jagan’s altering of the PPP foreign policy
toward greater association with the Eastern Bloc was a combination of a failure to obtain
American aid and a reaction to the Cuban Revolution. The success of the Cuban Revolution
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proved to Jagan that an independent course was possible with support from the Soviet Union and
Cuba to counter American dominance.
Melby’s opinion of Jagan deteriorated further on October 7, 1960 when newspapers in
the colony reported on a meeting between Jagan and East Indian businessmen quoting Jagan as
having told the businessmen that he would pursue ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union after
independence and that he would not assure free elections after independence. Jagan’s response to
these accusations was simply to state that no newspapermen were present at the meeting.38 Thus,
while questioning the legitimacy of the article, Jagan did not refute the claims of the article itself.
His ambiguous response was typical and increasingly his indirect public statements were
destructive to his image. Further damaging to the PPP’s position was the establishment of
educational relations between British Guiana and Eastern Bloc nations. In April 1960 Brindley
Benn, a close associate of the Jagans and leading member of the PPP visited Berlin and on
October 14, 1960, Cheddi Jagan announced at a press conference that the results of Benn’s visit
would soon be made public. He proudly proclaimed that six scholarships were to be awarded to
Guianese students to be educated in East Germany.39
The relationship between the Jagans and Cuba was further emphasized as the State
Department prepared for talks with British officials in 1961. In a position paper prepared by
United States officials, the State Department directly referenced the Cuban loan offer as evidence
that the Jagans were receiving financial support from Communist bloc countries. The report also
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characterizes the Jagans politics as persistently flirting with the Sino-Soviet bloc.40 The flirtation
cited included the maintenance of mail contact with communists in the West, frequent travel to
communist groups in Western countries, relationships with people connected to Soviet
embassies, and visits to communist nations. Also disconcerting to the State Department was the
plethora of communist literature in the PPP library in British Guiana and the active promotion of
Communist bloc nations in the party’s weekly newspaper Thunder. This pattern of flirtation with
communist groups was concerning enough to American officials, but there was more. Jagan’s
Achilles heel was his penchant for vocally supporting the international communist cause.41 The
State Department was also aware of the fact that the PPP had received financial aid and
organizational support for the upcoming Guianese elections from Chinese and Hungarian
sources.42
The extent to which Cheddi Jagan misunderstood the effect of global events on his
position is evidenced in a statement made in July 1961. With elections in the colony a month
away, Jagan attempted to explain his position toward foreign relations. He claimed that he would
continue a friendship with the United States under the condition that there were no strings
attached and the Americans accepted his principles of economic planning.43 While this statement
was not as incendiary to United States officials as his praise of the Cuban Revolution or his
attempts to develop ties to Eastern Bloc nations, it belies an elemental flaw in Jagan’s political
philosophy. The most important figure in Guianese politics overestimated his political leverage
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and ability to chart a non-aligned course of action, especially because of British Guiana’s
geographic proximity to the United States. The inability of the United States to control events in
Cuba altered the American foreign policy and Jagan misinterpreted the consequences for his
soon to be independent nation. The Cuban association with the Soviet Union solidified American
opposition to further hemispheric social revolutions and minimized the latitude with which local
politicians could conduct independent foreign policies, making the pursuit of a non-aligned
policy virtually impossible. The American decision to organize anti-Castro Cubans to invade at
the Bay of Pigs showed how adamantly the United States would try to squelch out any revolution
in the hemisphere that might become communist. Jagan may have hoped to pursue a non-aligned
foreign policy using his clientage as leverage to court the superpowers. However, American
policymakers were adamant that regional leaders take sides in the Cold War, especially after the
Cuban Revolution.
Furthermore, Jagan never fully understood the importance Great Britain placed on the
Anglo-American relationship. If Jagan hoped that Guiana’s status as a British colony would give
him latitude unavailable to independent hemispheric nations, he was incorrect. Relations with the
United States superseded the British desire to permit their colonial subjects truly autonomous
self-rule. In July 1961 Jagan simply did not comprehend that self-government for a British
colony in the Caribbean would be predicated on ties to the United States. Ultimately, Jagan never
seemed to understand that he had to take sides in the Cold War; and the consequences of taking
sides with the Eastern Bloc would cause anger in the United States and lead them to undermine
his regime. This fundamental flaw in Jagan’s political view was crucial to decisions made over
the subsequent two years by Britain and the United States, culminating in the Anglo-American
meeting at Birch Grove, England in June 1963. There, key British and American officials
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decided to remove Jagan as head of the Guianese government and establish an independent
Guyana under a coalition government made up of Burnham’s PNC and Peter D’Aguiar’s United
Force (UF).44
The Opportunity and Failure of PPP Policy from August 1961 to June 1962
The Kennedy Administration reassessed its policy toward British Guiana after failing to
thwart the PPP victory in August 1961. In early September Kennedy proposed a policy described
as an “across-the-board, whole-hearted attempt” to work with Jagan.45 The complete nature of
Kennedy Administration policy toward British Guiana is somewhat unclear due to the fact that a
substantial number of high level documents on the matter remain classified. However, the PPP’s
electoral victory gave Jagan a legitimate opportunity to win the third constituency, the United
States, and secure his position as head of an independent Guyana. In September 1961 the
dominant position in the new government was still in the hands of the PPP, even if the American
courtship of Jagan was half-hearted.
It is critical to note that President John F. Kennedy proposed a wholehearted diplomatic
attempt to work with Cheddi Jagan in August 1961, at the behest of Great Britain, after the PPP
won another colonial election.46 While the Kennedy Administration did not eliminate active CIA
operations against communist elements in the PPP, it appears the attempt to remove Jagan
temporarily became a contingency plan. Thus, Jagan was given a small window of opportunity to
prove to key American policymakers that he was a capable leader who was willing to work
within the constraints of the Cold War western hemispheric conditions. Between August 1961
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and June 1963, Jagan’s decisions were increasingly damaging to his political image. At a
meeting in Birch Grove, London, in June 1963 United States and British officials finally
determined to eliminate Jagan as head of the Guianese government.47 Poorly disguised covert
intervention displaced the PPP as the leading party in British Guiana and paved the road to
independence under a coalition government headed by Forbes Burnham. Ultimately, it was the
PPP’s actions, coupled with the adroit diplomacy of Burnham and the lack of a viable third
political figure, which solidified the American position and created the conditions under which
intervention would be successful.
A crucial caveat to the explanation set forth in this thesis is that much of the supporting
information is subject to refinement after further declassification of records from the United
States government. There is some reason to suspect that the Kennedy administration’s temporary
policy of cooperating with Jagan was a stall tactic meant to appease British officials who were
intent on granting independence to their colony at the earliest opportunity. Dean Rusk, the
United States Secretary of State, sent a strongly worded message to Lord Alec Home of the
Foreign Office in February 1962, mere days after the riots in Georgetown concluding that the
Kennedy Administration had: “tr[ied] your policy” of working with Jagan and that “…I have
reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana
under Jagan.”48 Rusk’s comments could be interpreted as a way of seeing the riots as an excuse
to abandon a policy never truly embraced by the Kennedy Administration. However, Rusk seems
to have held an extreme view within the Kennedy Administration, and the evidence suggests that
most American officials embraced the opportunity to work with Jagan, if reluctantly and only for
a time.
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There is more evidence that Kennedy’s stated policy change and decision to work with
Jagan was really a stall tactic to placate British officials eager to grant independence to the
colony. Correspondence between President Kennedy and Fowler Hamilton, Administrator for the
Agency of International Development is interesting in light of other circumstantial evidence.
Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President, indicated on January 12 that delays in
promised aid to British Guiana were threatening to undermine the president’s proposed policy of
“…an across-the-board, whole-hearted effort to work with Jagan.” Schlesinger feared that Jagan
would conclude that the United States had determined not to work with him if aid was not soon
forthcoming.49 Kennedy responded the same day with a memorandum for Hamilton demanding
immediate steps to be taken reassuring Jagan and sending an economic mission to the colony.
Kennedy set a deadline for this action of February 15.50 Riots erupted in Georgetown on
February 12. This exchange could be interpreted in two ways. It is possible that Kennedy
sincerely intended to work with Jagan and the riots were the result of the most unfortunate timing
for Jagan. It is also possible, and there is some evidence to suggest, that the CIA was already
working to undermine Jagan, and that Kennedy’s deadline was strategically chosen to fall after
the riots had begun.
The most plausible explanation is that Kennedy attempted to establish a relationship with
Jagan, while instructing the CIA to continue operations in British Guiana in order to subvert the
PPP government if diplomacy failed. It is also important to note that the Kennedy Administration
was not unified in its opposition to Jagan until late June, 1962. For about a year, most of his
advisors adopted a view somewhere between the extremes of Rusk, who adamantly opposed
Jagan, and Schlesinger, who sought a diplomatic resolution to ideological disagreements with the
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PPP leader. Kennedy seems to have drifted toward Rusk after meeting with Jagan in October,
1961 and the rest of the administration followed over the next eight months.
There is some suggestion in the historiography that suggests Kennedy’s stated attempt to
work with Jagan was insincere, as the above examples illustrate; however, such an assumption is
overly deterministic.51 Regardless of the genuineness of the Kennedy Administration’s attempt to
work with Jagan there are two key conclusions to be drawn which are essential to the premise
that Jagan himself played a crucial role in losing his position in British Guiana. First, at least
some key members of the Kennedy Administration were under the impression that working with
Jagan was, in fact, genuine policy. It is possible that Schlesinger was simply in the dark about
Kennedy’s true intentions; however, that would suggest a disjointed foreign policy in
Washington at the highest levels. Secondly, the British response to Rusk’s letter was a fiercely
worded rebuttal to the Secretary’s conclusions and their implications. Foreign Secretary Alec
Home strongly criticized Rusk’s suggestion that the British could undermine Jagan while
upholding the vestiges of a democratic government in the colony. The exchange was intense and
it is clear that the British were offended and, more significantly, opposed to Rusk’s suggestion
that intervention was possible in British Guiana.52 British administrators were squarely behind
Jagan in early 1962 and despite having some suspicion of Jagan, they felt he was the most
adequate leader in the colony. Thus, despite subversive efforts by the United States, strong
opposition from some upper level members of the Kennedy Administration, and a series of

51

Stephen Rabe suggests that Kennedy used Jagan’s appearance on Meet the Press in October 1961 as an excuse to
pursue the policy of subversion which he intended to advance regardless. Rabe argues that Kennedy determined
against working with Jagan prior to his meeting with the Guianese leader October 25. Despite Kennedy’s personal
feelings, there is evidence to suggest that his administration’s policy was sincere, with the exception of Secretary of
State Dean Rusk. More importantly, it is critical to acknowledge that the course of Guianese history was not
determined on the personal feelings of the President of the United States alone. See: Rabe, U. S. Intervention in
British Guiana, 87-88.
52
Home to Rusk, 26 February 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, 12:266.

117

political missteps following his electoral victory in August 1961, Jagan was far from defeated
politically in early 1962.
Finally, it is important to qualify the impact that United States-inspired subversive
attempts may have had in British Guiana. Much of the high level State Department
correspondence which could clarify the exact nature of the United States role in subverting the
PPP remains classified. Former CIA operative Philip Agee suggests that American backed covert
operations began at least in 1959 and the work of scholars such as Stephen Rabe, Thomas
Spinner, and Gordon Oliver Daniels has focused heavily on the role of American intervention as
the determinant factor in the decolonization of British Guiana.53 However, this chapter suggests
that even if there was a sustained covert attempt to dislodge Jagan, the likelihood of success
would have been far from certain and while American inspired subversive attempts played a
crucial role in effecting the trajectory of Guianese decolonization, they alone do not explain why
the United States chose to undermine Jagan in the first place. The goals of covert interventions
were achieved in instances such as Guatemala and Iran; however, they often failed disastrously,
the clearest example of such failure being the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Schlesinger gave the
probability of success for operations in British Guiana as less than fifty percent even after the
Kennedy Administration shifted internal discussion from strategy, to tactics and determined to
pursue solely a course of subverting Jagan.54 This chapter will suggest that after the PPP’s
electoral victory in August 1961 Jagan retained the support of Great Britain and the most critical
capitalist investors in the colony. Additionally, it suggests that Jagan had an opportunity to
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establish an effective relationship with the Kennedy Administration until mid-1962. Therefore,
while the exact beginning of CIA operations in British Guiana is uncertain, their existence alone
did not guarantee the demise of the PPP. The PPP position became untenable only after Jagan
failed at establishing an effective relationship with the Kennedy Administration and finally lost
the support of British colonial officials. Ultimately, the Jagans’ attempts to develop closer
relations between British Guiana and the communist world was the primary factor which
influenced Anglo-American policymaking and combined with external Cold War events,
specifically in Cuba, to create an untenable situation for the PPP in British Guiana.
Kennedy invited Cheddi Jagan to Washington D. C. in October 1961 as an indication that
the United States sincerely hoped to work with the Guianese politician, and more importantly as
a way to determine Jagan’s true ideological position. Jagan’s trip to the United States would
prove to be the best opportunity he had to win the support of Washington, as well as an
American public increasingly interested in international events in the Caribbean. The State
Department “saw no real alternative to British policy” in early October and envisioned working
with Jagan, if he could have a successful trip to the United States, according to Schlesinger.55
Jagan’s visit would revolve around two key issues and his inability to comprehend the
importance of the second issue proved to be a disastrous error. Jagan’s primary goal in visiting
Washington was to obtain economic aid crucial for the development of British Guiana. The
Americans intended on determining once and for all Jagan’s political ideology and intentions for
an independent Guyana. Melby summarized the American view clearly in a telegram to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. He stressed: “Ideological issues should be met fully at outset at
high level…We should tell him frankly our concern about Communist involvement and tell him
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we expect equally frank statement from him on his position.”56 Melby also noted that Jagan’s
visit would prove to be: “an unparalleled opportunity to sell himself and his country to the U.S.”,
while providing the ominous warning that: “U.S. newsmen are hard-headed pros who will needle
him to see how he stands up under questioning.”57
The Prime Minister’s visit began with an introduction to the American public on the
weekly news program Meet the Press. Jagan’s performance was a public relations debacle that
tainted his trip to the United States and signaled the beginning of a final erosion of the working
relationship Kennedy had hoped to establish. He responded to his interviewers with inept and
ambiguous answers, dodging simple ideological questions posed to him, rather than providing
frank statements to clarify his ideological position as American officials had hoped.58 When he
did attempt to engage in ideological conversation, Jagan resorted to making statements that
sounded like pure Leninist ideology.59 Kennedy’s response was predictable in light of the
circumstances. According to Schlesinger, the President responded to the interview by: “call[ing]
for a re-examination of all aspects of the problem.” Jagan had placed himself in a difficult
position before he gathered himself to meet the President the following day.
Kennedy and Jagan met on October 25, and the first order of business for the American
President was to determine Jagan’s political ideology. Jagan evaded questions of doctrine,
claiming that he was too unfamiliar with theory to distinguish between the various forms of
socialism, which appeared to administration officials present to include communism. The
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Guianese leader also claimed that he was uncommitted in the Cold War and he did not wish to
become engaged in the conflict.60 Kennedy was discontented with Jagan’s evasiveness and the
fact that he also requested a massive aid package, which Schlesinger described as: “all out of
proportion to the size of his country.” Nonetheless, Kennedy was aware of the British contention
that Jagan remained the only viable option for leadership in a soon to be independent Guyana.61
Ultimately, the first and most outstanding failure in Jagan’s attempt to establish himself as a
legitimate head of state in the immediate years prior to independence was the direct result of his
inadequate statesmanship, not operations conducted against him by a foreign power. American
foreign policy in the Caribbean after the Cuban Revolution demanded that regional leaders
rhetorically support the United States. Jagan’s refusal to commit to supporting the United States
convinced American officials that he was actively working against them.
Before the Kennedy administration had time to digest Jagan’s visit, the Guianese leader
and his party embarked on a relentless series of political maneuvers which added to the suspicion
of United States officials. After returning to Georgetown the first week of November Jagan was
quoted in the Trinidad Guardian suggesting that he would soon seek financial aid from the
Soviet Union.62 Later that month, Melby forwarded information to the Department of State
elaborating on the travels of six important PPP members, all of whom traveled to Cuba, Moscow,
or Eastern Bloc nations.63 In closing an independence motion debate for the colony, Jagan
referred to capitalism in the United States as a dying system, which he elaborated on in an
60
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attempt to prove the evils of such an economic structure and later was quoted refusing to assure
free elections after independence.64 Beginning in December, Jagan actively sought a solution to
the racial discrepancy in the colony’s armed civil services. His pursuit of arms and training from
various sources was a constant cause of suspicion from United States officials.
Resolving the drastic racial imbalances in the police force was a legitimate concern.
Increasing polarization of politics on ethnic grounds between 1955 and late 1961 was beginning
to manifest itself in violent ways. A racially diversified police force was essential for the colony
to maintain order in the post-independence period. However, Jagan’s decision to pursue training
from Israel and arms from a number of Eastern Bloc sources, rather than the United States,
represents another failure of Jagan to properly contextualize his political reality. The reaction of
Secretary of State Dean Rusk in response to an article in the Jerusalem Post is useful in
understanding the key problem with Jagan’s policy. Rusk sent a telegram to American Embassies
in London and Tel Aviv and the Consulate in Georgetown seeking further information about
Jagan’s pursuit of Israeli military assistance in conjunction with rumors of a PPP attempt to form
youth camps in British Guiana for physical training and political indoctrination.65 Melby
confirmed that the PPP had intentions of creating a supplemental police force loyal to the party.66
Jagan had failed to realize that actively seeking arms and military training, and keeping the
United States in the dark about it, would only result in more suspicion from Washington. His
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actions reinforced the fears held by American policymakers that he was secretly attempting to
establish a communist beachhead on mainland South America.
The foreign policy of the PPP continued to antagonize the United States during the first
month and a half of 1962, even as the domestic situation in British Guiana became increasingly
volatile. The American Embassy in Warsaw informed the Department of State on January 18 that
Janet Jagan visited Poland and was interviewed by Slowo Powzechne en route to Moscow.67 An
article in the PPP newspaper Thunder earlier in the month attributed inflammatory comments
about capitalism to the party’s Parliamentary Secretary, Jack Kelshall, who claimed that the PPP
would “ultimately destroy” big business. Melby forwarded this information to the Department of
State, adding that the Secretary was a close associate of Cheddi Jagan and his comments should
be assumed to be party dogma.68
By mid-January 1962 five months had passed since Jagan won re-election and the
Kennedy Administration had agreed to attempt to work with the Prime Minister. Rather than
engaging in insightful statesmanship during that period, Jagan’s actions in fact reinforced the
American perception that he was a communist conspirator who was seeking to establish a second
Cuba on the South American mainland. Posterity suggests that American fears were considerably
overblown and perception obscured by what is frequently referred to as Cold War lenses.
However, in January 1962, Jagan was proving that he lacked the ability to conduct a realistic
foreign policy and effectively promote his party’s cause. Despite Jagan’s imprudent dealings, he
was still the colony’s leading political figure and his only legitimate rival, Burnham, was
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unappealing to both the United States and Great Britain. Therefore, Jagan retained a clear
advantage over his opposition when the Georgetown riots began on February 12.
Demonstrators took to the streets of Georgetown on February 12, ostensibly objecting to
Jagan’s proposed budget and a compulsory savings scheme. Within four days the city was ablaze
as racial antagonisms exploded and protests turned violent. Burnham and D’Aguiar used the
budget and increasing unrest as an attempt to oust the Jagan government from power.69 It is
almost certain that Burnham was receiving financial assistance from the United States, or at least
American labor unions, to prolong the strike.70 Unrest was finally quelled by the arrival of
British troops in the city, not by any action of the PPP-led government. The implications of
American involvement in the disturbance are somewhat misleading. The most likely explanation
is that the Kennedy Administration’s contingency plan of subverting the PPP government took
on a new level of urgency with the prospect of independence for the colony in the very near
future. Violent unrest could be used as a pretext for delaying self-government until the United
States could determine what to do about Jagan. However, it would be premature to allege that
differences between Jagan and the United States had become entirely irreconcilable or that the
Kennedy Administration had established a definitive position of opposition to Jagan.
Despite Rusk’s conclusion on February 19 that the United States could not accept a
Jagan-led government, Kennedy stated plainly that no decision had been made on policy toward
British Guiana almost a month later.71 Alec Home’s biting response to Rusk and Ian MacLeod’s
strong assertion that Jagan was not a communist and: “infinitely preferable to Burnham” makes
69
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clear that British officials still considered Jagan the legitimate leader of the colony and had no
intentions of subverting his government.72 Retrospectively it is apparent that the United States
was in the process of assuming the lead role in British Guiana; however, in early 1962 British
Guiana remained under the authority of Great Britain. The British Colonial Office was
responsible for making the final determination of who would lead the colony upon independence,
and in March 1962, the British did not seriously entertain the thought of eliminating Jagan in lieu
of Burnham.
Finally, Jagan retained the support of the primary capital investors in the colony, Bookers
Brothers and ALCON, who stated plainly that he was preferable to any alternative leader.73 Their
support was more of an indictment against Burnham than confidence in Jagan; nonetheless, even
after the riots, Jagan remained the most likely prospect to lead the colony to independence. His
hold on the government was slipping and the opportunity to achieve the necessary support of the
United States was eroding at a quickening pace; however, he held the support of virtually every
other powerful group interested in the future of the colony. Rusk’s opinion can be taken as an
indicator of a strengthening opposition at the highest levels of the United States government;
however, it was not an indication that Jagan’s government had become unsustainable. It was not
even an indication of a unified policy opposing Jagan within the United States government.
From a political standpoint, the most damaging aspect of the riots for the PPP was the
realization that without British assistance, Jagan was incapable of maintaining order in the
colony. Colonial officials were increasingly fearful that British Guiana would degenerate into
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open racial warfare and even civil war after Her Majesty’s troops were withdrawn.74 The
international community, specifically the United Nations (UN), was increasingly concerned with
the humanitarian effects of global decolonization in the wake of disastrous European
withdrawals from Africa. While many British officials had sincere concern for their former
colony, international pressure to depart in an orderly fashion was the greatest factor impacting
British withdrawal strategies. Great Britain did not want to lose standing in the international
community by granting premature independence to the colony if the consequence was domestic
strife.75 Burnham’s best opportunity to gain British support was by proving that a Jagan-led
government would lead to instability and internal discord. The riots placed that idea in the minds
of British officials for the first time.
As damaging as the riots were to Jagan, the response of his party had a worse effect on
his standing, both in the colony and internationally. An article in Thunder attributed the riot to a
plot by “fascists” in Washington and claimed that it was a: “dismal failure on the part of the CIA
and its stooges.”76 The consequence of aggressively condemning the United States was further
antagonizing an already hostile administration, regardless of the accuracy of the claim that
elements in Washington were behind or involved in the violence. Jagan himself made no public
reply to the challenge of his authority, confirming to many his impotence as a leader. The only
statements from the PPP were made were passing remarks by Kelshall and Janet Jagan.77 Finally,
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the PPP increased its attempts to establish a police force loyal to the party as an alternative to the
current Afro-Guianese dominated civil services. This maneuver appeared reasonable on the
surface; however, Jagan’s decision to act without consulting Great Britain or the United States,
served only to arouse suspicion about his intentions.78
Conversely, Forbes Burnham was working diligently to gain the support of United States
officials. Burnham requested arms from the United States base at Atkinson Airfield during the
February crisis, allegedly to stop the violence. Melby was quick to criticize Burnham’s actions as
irresponsible and the PNC leader as more dangerous than ever; however, his negative response
obscures one critical fact: Burnham had looked to the United States for assistance in the crisis.79
The considerable number of classified documents in United States government records leaves
open the possibility that Burnham was acting under the advice of American agents, and he
certainly was responsible in part for stimulating the violence in the first place. Regardless, the
crucial conclusion to be drawn from the comparison is that Burnham had begun to actively seek
allegiance with the United States while Jagan seemed politically lost and responded to the crisis
by lambasting the Americans. From the perspective of the Kennedy Administration, the Cuban
Revolution made Western Hemispheric unity more vital than ever by early 1962. Burnham took
advantage of this political reality and vehemently sought to win approval in the United States on
every level. He worked to appease diplomats while appealing to the African-American public by
vocally supporting Martin Luther King, Jr.80 Foreign policy dynamics would ultimately
determine which Guianese leader would win the third constituency and lead the colony to
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independence and Burnham was beginning to prove that he had the advantage in diplomatic
ability.
The spring of 1962 saw two important developments in Guianese politics which further
exemplify the opposing courses being pursued by Jagan and Burnham. On April 28 the PPP held
its annual party elections with the result being a radicalization of the organization. Balram Singh
Rai, Minister of Home Affairs, either left or was expelled from the party allegedly because he
opposed the strong communist direction the party was moving toward.81 While Melby kept the
State Department informed of developments within the PPP, Burnham was working with AFLCIO president George Meaney and pushing for a visit to the United States.82 Despite misgivings
from some officials in the State Department about how such a meeting would be interpreted by
the British, Burnham arrived in the United States in early May and met with Schlesinger on May
3. Burnham achieved a rousing success where Jagan had failed miserably six months earlier.
Burnham spoke at length about developing ties to the United States and explained that he
advocated private enterprise in an independent Guyana, while inquiring about obtaining
educational scholarships for Guianese students to travel to the United States. Burnham also
claimed to have begun to resolve the Venezuela border crisis, which remained an internationalrelations concern for the inter-American community after British Guiana achieved independence.
Finally, Burnham told Schlesinger that he knew from personal experience that the Jagans were
international communists and that Janet Jagan had been in Cuba as recently as February.83
Schlesinger was so impressed by Burnham that he invited him for drinks the following
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evening.84Adding to Burnham’s success was the fact that Jagan visited the UN in New York
during the same month, and met with Soviet and Polish diplomats, while never approaching
anyone from the United States.85
There is a stark contrast between Burnham’s visit in May and Jagan’s visit six months
earlier and the difference is telling. Jagan’s insistence on defending his ideological position and
his inability to successfully engage important American officials was the catalyst for his lost
opportunity with the United States. Burnham, in contrast, whose personal character was highly
suspect to British and American officials alike, won over American diplomats during his visit.86
Burnham did not permit his socialist ideology to hamper his persistent courtship of the third
constituency over the summer of 1962. Like Figueres in Costa Rica and Trujillo during the 1930s
and 1940s, Burnham adapted his ideology to political realities while Jagan struggled through the
Royal Commission hearings into the February riots. Most notably, Burnham understood the
declining influence of Great Britain and the overwhelming significance of acknowledging the
primacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Slowly, Burnham’s political
opportunism and Jagan’s struggle to keep to his ideals convinced the Kennedy Administration
that Burnham was the necessary, if far from ideal, choice to lead British Guiana to independence.
The political climate in British Guiana increasingly favored Forbes Burnham into the
summer of 1962 and by the end of June, Cheddi Jagan had finally destroyed his changes of
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reconciliation with the United States. On June 4 Burnham repeated his request to the United
States for educational scholarships for Guianese students, to counter his opponents attempt to
send students behind the “Iron Curtain”.87 Meanwhile, PPP Acting Premier Brindley Benn was
quoted on several occasions praising the impending success of communism and criticizing the
United States.88 Rai left the PPP for good on June 21, indicating to Melby that the PPP was
moving in a more radical direction.89 Despite these developments, British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan told Kennedy that he hoped the United States would continue to try and work with
Jagan if he remained the choice of the people.90 It is imperative to note that even in mid-1962
Jagan held the political high ground on every front except with his relationship to the United
States. Jagan had spent nearly a decade as the head of, or primary figure in, Guianese politics and
he had consistently engaged in political moves indicating a communist inclination. For nine
months after Kennedy’s call for cooperation, Jagan pursued poorly conceived foreign diplomacy,
yet he had not entirely isolated himself from the United States. Jagan’s Waterloo occurred during
the Riot Commission Hearings in late June, and this time, his blunder was one from which he
would not recover.
From June 22-28, 1962, Great Britain held a public inquiry into the disastrous riots of the
previous February in Georgetown. Lionel Luckhoo, an East Indian lawyer, questioned Cheddi
Jagan’s political ideology during the proceedings in a manner similar to Jagan’s interview on
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Meet the Press the previous October. Jagan’s ability to withstand difficult questioning had not
improved. After several inconclusive responses to Luckhoo’s interrogation, Jagan finally uttered
the phrase which annihilated his chances of ever working with the United States: “I am a
communist.”91 To the Kennedy Administration, those words spoken by a man who was a
political liability at best, and perhaps an international communist, combined with a long list of
suspicious relationships with the Eastern Bloc, confirmed their worst fears. American reaction
was immediate and conclusive. Connecticut senator Thomas Dodd reiterated Jagan’s remarks on
the floor of the senate the first week of July, including further statements made during the
hearings where Jagan referred to Castro as “the greatest liberator of the twentieth century.”92
United States senators received thousands of letters from American citizens objecting to the idea
of sending aid to British Guiana so long as Jagan remained in charge of the colony.93 The same
week Jagan’s personal secretary, Jack Kelshall, stated flatly that both he and Jagan were
communists, which only served to further confirm to Melby that Jagan’s assertion should be
taken seriously.94 Jagan’s statement was the culmination of a decade of ill-conceived diplomacy
and ideological statements and the result was a final severance with the United States.
The Kennedy Administration never again entertained working with Jagan and that policy
continued through the Johnson Administration until Jagan was effectively defeated through an
engineered electoral scheme in which Burnham ascended to the primary position of authority in
British Guiana, and in time, led the colony to independence. By mid-July 1962, United States
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officials had ceased discussing strategy in British Guiana and began discussing tactics,
committing themselves completely to a covert program to overthrow Jagan. The determination
that Jagan would be subverted was final, what remained was convincing Great Britain to go
along with the American plan.95
The Loss of British Support and the Anglo-American Decision to Remove the PPP
Jagan’s political strategy remained consistent throughout the subsequent year. He
continued to pursue arms and training deals with Israel, provoking the ire of British officials who
were displeased with Jagan’s attempt to circumvent the colonial government in his effort to
improve the police force.96 PPP members continued to negotiate closer ties to communist nations
and travel between the colony and communist nations went on unabated.97 The Jagans still spoke
affectionately of Castro and the communist world, even after the Cuban Missile Crisis.98 More
importantly, Jagan continually put the British in an awkward position vis a vis the United States.
Meanwhile, Burnham worked tirelessly to foster ties with the United States, traveling to New
York to reassure American officials that he would remain anti-communist after Jagan was
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defeated.99 In December he pressed Melby for the third time to obtain scholarships for Guianese
students to study in the United States.100
Despite the totality of the American aversion to Jagan, a number of British colonial
officials, and members of Parliament, remained adamantly opposed to Burnham. The majority of
British officials, specifically those in the Colonial Office, believed that the best scenario for an
independent Guyana was a government under Cheddi Jagan.101 There continued to be
contentious exchanges between the British Foreign Office and the State Department in
Washington over the future of British Guiana throughout late 1962 and early 1963. Some
members of the Colonial Office never agreed with the American decision to back Forbes
Burnham. However, the overriding imperative for Great Britain in British Guiana was preparing
the colony for independence. Since the early 1960s, the British had been eager to shed the weight
of an economically draining relic of imperialism and sought to establish a stable, sustainable
government in British Guiana.102 By 1963 Jagan’s failure to maintain multi-racial support in the
colony, in part because of inter-racial conflict fostered by the United States, had rendered the
PPP incapable of sustaining social order. The primarily Afro-Guianese police force simply
stopped accepting orders from the elected government, effectively leaving Jagan the head of a
government which did not function. While it is important to acknowledge that elements of the
United States government worked to achieve this end for several years, the British took care to
note that: “Jagan and his party have constituted the government of the colony for the last six
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years [and thus] they and their policies must bear a share of the blame.”103 Inequalities in the
racial composition of the Guianese police force left Forbes Burnham the only Guianese leader
capable of ending the social unrest and stabilizing Guianese society in a short amount of time.
Thus, British and American imperatives in British Guiana began to run parallel and made the
British decision to work with the United States possible.
After delaying independence for a year, British officials came to the realization that the
schism between Jagan and the United States was irreparable, and that regardless, Jagan was
incapable of establishing stability in the colony. British and American officials agreed that the
PPP would move to establish a communist government based on the Cuban model after
independence. American officials were confident that intervention was necessary to thwart the
communist threat, while the British suggested that there was a possibility of internal opposition
in British Guiana being strong enough to keep Jagan from succeeding.104 Despite misgivings
about Burnham, the British acquiesced to American wishes. Britain’s desire to withdraw from
the colony and the strength of the United States Cold War imperatives superseded British
hesitation to support Burnham. Anglo-American talks were held at Birch Grove, England on
June 30, 1963 and Kennedy, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy traveled from the United States to
meet with Macmillan, Home, and Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys. The discussion shifted
between British opposition to Burnham and American refusal to work with Jagan until Sandys
finally concluded that a: “Burnham-D’Aguiar government will collapse by
itself…unless…United States was prepared to shore it up, this would change the situation.”105
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The United States contingency caught the insinuation and Jagan’s fate was sealed. Despite
Labour Party opposition, Sandys began working on implementing a plan of proportional
representation for the next round of colonial elections, which led to a victory for the BurnhamD’Aguiar coalition and Jagan’s defeat in the final elections before independence in British
Guiana.106
The defeat of the PPP in British Guiana prior to independence was the culmination of
several important factors. Cold War imperatives effected Anglo-American strategy in the
Caribbean. Covert intervention by the United States destabilized the colony and challenged PPP
authority in Georgetown. Great Britain’s decision to pursue electoral change and a final election
before independence resulted in Jagan’s loss at the polls in December 1964 paving the way for
Burnham to lead the colony to self-rule. However, the PPP’s attempt to move British Guiana into
the communist camp, and Forbes Burnham’s timely courting of the United States, provided the
most important basis for the policies pursued by the United States and Great Britain. The actions
of these men ultimately framed the policy options available in Washington and determined the
future of their country. Politics do not occur in a vacuum, a reality which is obvious in two ways
for Guyana. Cheddi Jagan’s inability to conduct a foreign policy based on his political reality
condemned him to ideological policymaking and political failure. Additionally, United States
officials determined to implement a more forceful anti-communist policy after the Cuban
Revolution and Castro’s seizure of power in Havana. Their opposition to Jagan was not based on
a McCarthy-esque witch hunt. Rather, it was predicated on Jagan’s persistent Marxist ideology
and the PPP’s foreign policy which was increasingly antagonistic toward the United States. It
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was the logical response to the maneuvers of Jagan himself in the context of a Cold War
Caribbean.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This thesis examined the end of colonial rule in British Guiana as a microcosm to explore
how changes in the global power structure were manifested in the collective dynamics of the
Cold War and global decolonization during the mid-twentieth century. Decolonization in British
Guiana was similar to that which was occurring simultaneously across the globe as European
empires prepared their colonies for independence after the Second World War. Nationalist
leaders maneuvered to pursue the most independent form of government available within the
context of the post war world, always framed by the superpower struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union as well as the interests of colonial powers trying to end their
domination of developing areas in the most advantageous manner possible. Guianese leaders
were free to pursue self-government, but only within a specific framework acceptable to the
United States, which sought to assert itself as the hemispheric leader by pressuring decolonizing
Caribbean nations into alignment with the West, specifically after the Cuban Revolution and its
subsequent alignment with the Soviet Union. British Guiana’s geographic proximity to the
United States ensured that the American government would wield a strong influence on the
decolonization process of the colony. Guianese politicians aimed to achieve independence as
quickly as possible, but only under circumstances which would benefit them as individual
leaders. Cheddi Jagan’s attempt to establish either a non-aligned or communist oriented foreign
policy directly conflicted with the United States and led to American intervention in the colony.
Conversely, Forbes Burnham pursued a foreign policy aligned with the United States. By
courting American leadership, Burnham assured his position as the head of British Guiana after
independence. At varying points in the decolonization process, the United States, Great Britain,
and each individual Guianese leader were motivated to push for an increase or decrease in the
137

pace of British withdrawal from the colony. Thus, the story of Guianese independence is the
story of the competing interests of nationalist leaders, former colonizers, and a Cold War
superpower.
This thesis is also a study of United States Cold War policy in the post-Cuban Revolution
Caribbean. American policy in the hemisphere underwent significant changes in the early years
after Fidel Castro’s government took power in Havana. The complexity of these changes is
evident in British Guiana. President John F. Kennedy took a harder line against communism as a
result of the Cuban association with the Soviet Union; however, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
Kennedy sought to pragmatically work with regional leaders who engaged in moderate domestic
policies.1 Thus, the United States presented regional leaders with the latitude to engage in some
programs of domestic reform if they could conduct an effective foreign policy with the United
States.2 Comparing the foreign policies of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’s
National Congress (PNC) provides an excellent example of the American policy in the region.
The first chapter examined how the colonial history of British Guiana created a volatile
society with distinct political, economic, and social characteristics which defined the manner in
which the colony progressed toward independence. Colonial structures and immigration patterns
created a culturally pluralistic society in British Guiana which nationalist leaders and foreign
powers exploited with violent consequences during the independence period.3 British Guiana’s
1

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), 776.
2
Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States During the Rise of Jose Figueres
(Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1997); Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good
Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press,
1998).
3
Leo A. Despres, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 1967; Cheddi Jagan, The West On Trial: My Fight For Guyana’s Freedom (New York: International
Publishers, 1966); Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana(Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2005) ; Thomas Spinner, A Political and Social History of Guyana 1945-83 (Boulder: Westview

138

political development was also the result of its colonial development and the nature of political
organizations and ideology in the colony resulted in conflict with the United States.4 Thus, the
decolonization process in British Guiana was the culmination of its colonial legacy of ethnic
segregation and union-dominated leftist politics.
The second chapter examined the complex relationship between the United States and
Great Britain in coordinating policy in British Guiana. Each nation pursued individual strategic
objectives in the colony; however, both nations placed the Anglo-American special relationship
above their individual interests in the region and ultimately worked together to develop a unified
policy toward British Guiana. United States officials were concerned with British Guiana as an
aspect of American Cold War geo-strategy while British officials were principally concerned
with the logistics of decolonizing their empire. The Cold War and decolonization were two
aspects of a global shift in power structure away from European nation states and as such they
were intricately related. British Guiana is an excellent example of how the Cold War and
decolonization dynamics functioned together in a cyclical relationship. Most importantly, the
Cold War and decolonization begat instability; thus, establishing a stable government in British
Guiana became the primary concern of both the United States and Great Britain. The AngloAmerican decision to undermine the PPP in British Guiana is best understood as the consequence
of the need for stability and American insistence with assuring pro-Western governments in the
post-Cuban Revolution Caribbean.
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Finally, the third chapter examined the PPP foreign policy and how it impacted American
and British decisions in British Guiana. The foreign policies of Guianese nationalist leaders
contributed significantly to the independence movement in the colony. Most historians have
focused on two aspects of the decolonization process in British Guiana: domestic reform
movements and foreign intervention. Their argument has been that the democratically elected
PPP government, led by Cheddi Jagan, pursued mild social reform movements and became a
victim of American communist paranoia. Most scholars acknowledge that Jagan espoused
Marxist ideology, but subordinate the impact of such rhetoric on American policymaking to the
significance of upholding a staunch anti-communist ideology.5Thus, traditional historiography
has been critical of American intervention in British Guiana. This thesis does not seek to be an
apologist for interventionist policies, or to in any way suggest that American interference with
the self-determination of developing nations was or is justified. However, this project does
suggest that the American decision making process was more complex than has been suggested
in the historiography. While this thesis certainly does not blame Jagan for American
intervention, it does suggest that the PPP foreign policy was primarily responsible for the
Kennedy Administration’s decision to support Forbes Burnham. Regardless of the moral
judgment history will hold for American Cold War policy, it still needs to be understood why
such a policy was pursued. This thesis is primarily concerned with the reasons that the United
States and eventually Great Britain were opposed to Cheddi Jagan, and why they chose to
subvert his government. United States opposition to Jagan grew in intensity as Jagan’s foreign
5

Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: The World
Publishing Company, 1968); Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana; Spinner, A Political and Social History of
Guyana; James L. McDonald, “Overriding Interests: Subversion as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy” (Ph.D.
diss., American University, 1997; Jennifer Dale Kibe, “Presidents as Kingmakers: U.S. Decisions to Overthrow
Foreign Governments” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2002); Gordon Oliver Daniels, “A Great
Injustice to Cheddi Jagan: The Kennedy Administration and British Guiana, 1961-63” (Ph.D. Diss., University of
Mississippi, 2000).

140

policy became more openly communist. It is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate
subversion as an aspect of American policy; however, it is important to acknowledge that
American intervention was successful in large part because of the complicity of key Guianese,
specifically Burnham. Thus, this thesis considers the crucial role of nationalist leaders in British
Guiana in creating their own history.
A brief look at Forbes Burnham’s policies after independence will serve as a final
testament to the agency of nationalist leaders in the developing world and dispense with the
notion that Burnham was simply Washington’s pawn. During the 1970s Burnham nationalized
the economy through the expropriation of foreign enterprises, such as Booker Brothers and
Canadian and American bauxite companies. He described his economic policy as a “cooperative
socialism”, and it was the exact type of anti-capitalist system that British and American officials
hoped to avoid by subverting the PPP and supporting Burnham’s government before
independence.6 Additionally, Burnham actively participated in the non-aligned movement,
beginning in 1970, and by the middle of the decade he had established diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, and most of Eastern Europe.7 However, the true tragedy of
Burnham’s government was the misery it inflicted on the people of Guyana. Burnham
maintained power through fraudulent elections and the repression of the populace. He
strengthened the armed forces and used them to suppress the East Indian population with
extreme violence. Guyana was one of the poorest, most crime-ridden nations in the world by the
end of the 1970s.8 Thus, the sad irony of Anglo-American intervention is that in subverting the
PPP government to avoid a repressive, corrupt, single party, communist oriented government,
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British and American officials were largely responsible for its establishment. However, the
Guianese did not sit idly and watch as the United States manipulated the future of their colony.
Guianese leaders were actively engaged in international politics and Anglo-American
intervention was largely the result of their actions.
Future Research
There is considerable room for further research on the topics discussed in this thesis.
Historians will continue to refine the story of decolonization in British Guiana as more United
States documents become declassified. Clearly United States intervention had considerable
influence on decolonization in British Guiana; however, the specifics of American involvement
remain imprecise due to the considerable number of upper level State Department records on
British Guiana which remain classified. Scholars have made use of other archival resources to
explore the role of American subversion in the colony; however, the declassification of
governmental records will improve on current research.9 Scholars will be better able to quantify
the effects of American involvement as they more accurately determine the timing and nature of
American intervention.
Similarly, there has been little to no research conducted in the archives of the communist
nations with which the United States suspected the PPP of having relations. As this paper has
shown, there was a significant level of correspondence and travel between PPP members and
some Eastern Bloc nations. Examining archives in Cuba, East Germany, Russia, China, and
Poland, would allow historians to better ascertain the nature of PPP interaction with those
nations and shed light on the Jagans’ intentions for a post-colonial British Guiana, either
9
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strengthening or weakening criticism of Anglo-American decisions in the colony. Historians
have tended to ignore the possibility that the Jagans were in fact attempting to pursue the type of
Castro-like communist government the United States claimed. A comparative study of the early
Castro government in Cuba and the Jagans’ plans for British Guiana could be equally
enlightening. Evidence which supported the American claims would be cause for a re-evaluation
of the criticism surrounding American intervention, even while such studies would not excuse
interventionist policies.
Cold War history is becoming increasingly inclusive as historians such as Odd Arne
Westad and Jason Parker expand on previous interpretations to incorporate the impact of
developing nations on the trajectory of the era.10 The trend of de-emphasizing the role of
superpower actors will likely continue as more research is conducted in what were previously
considered peripheral areas and a more nuanced understanding of the twentieth century will
emerge. Additionally, the close relationship between the Cold War and European decolonization
will continue to merge as historians explore the shift away from European centers of power after
World War II.11 Colonized people were always an integral part of global European colonization
through collaboration and resistance; however, by the mid-twentieth century, they were affecting
the structure of that system of global order unlike any time since the mid-fifteenth century.
Future research will likely strengthen our understanding of the connections between the
struggle for autonomy in formerly colonized areas and the efforts of the United States and the
Soviet Union to resist drastic change and establish influence in developing areas. British Guiana
10
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is useful as a historical study in the manner in which it is unique; however, it is most significant
because it is not entirely exceptional. The twentieth-century was a period which saw a
redefinition of the global power structure and the struggle for supremacy in the re-ordering world
took place most actively in formerly colonized areas. The two primary global powers after World
War II, the United States and the Soviet Union maneuvered for dominance through ideology and
occasionally proxy wars while nationalist leaders sought self-government absent the influence of
any foreign power. International organizations such as the United Nations wielded what
influence they could to maintain global peace to resolve the conflict of interest resulting from
superpower influence and nationalist sentiment. Thus, simultaneously the world fragmented and
came together.12 The story of the twentieth-century will increasingly cease to be two stories of
East-West relations and North-South relations and become an amalgamation of North-SouthEast-West dynamics.
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